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Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy
Challenges for Managing Neglected Diseases
and Affordable Prescription Drugs
Taiwo A. Oriola*
INTRODUCTION
There is a myriad of diseases to which the human body is vulnerable. If an
anomaly is due to a malfunctioning enzyme, scientists could use a molecule to cor-
rect the errant enzyme, or block the receptor to which the enzyme is attached.1 In
pharmaceutical parlance, the molecule is a compound;2 however, in lay terms, it is
a drug.3 As one of the most regulated consumer products, it is inevitable that drugs
would have a legal definition. Article 1 of the European Union Directive
65/65/EEC defines a drug as any substance designed to prevent or treat diseases in
humans or animals.4 This is in pari materia with s. 321(g)(1) of the United States
* Cardiff Law School and the ESRC Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability,
Sustainability, & Society, (BRASS) Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, UK.
1 See Fran Hawthorne, The Merck Druggernaut: The Inside Story of a Pharmaceutical
Giant, (Hoboken: New Jersey, 2003) at 72.
2 For example, more than half of all prescriptions filled in the United States in 1993
consisted of at least one major active compound. See Kerry Ten Kate & Sarah A.
Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity, Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
Sharing, (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1999) at 34.
3 Molecules are traditionally found in microorganisms that live in soil, sludge, decayed
plants, etc. For instance, penicillin was derived from mold, while Merck’s anticholes-
terol statins are fungus-based. Today, compounds are increasingly made chemically
rather than derived from natural sources. According to Kate and Laird, research for
products derived from natural sources has become unappealing to many pharmaceutical
researchers because it is slow and expensive. Consequently, rather than seeking new
chemicals existing in nature, most companies often prefer to screen libraries of syn-
thetic compounds for basic inorganic and petroleum-based chemicals. See ibid. at 50
and 56.
4 See Article 1 of Directive 65/65/EEC on the Approximation of Provisions laid down by
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action relating to Proprietary Medicinal Products,
Official Journal 022, 09/02/1965P 0369-0373, (26 January 1965).
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Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act;5 s. 2 of the Canadian Food and Drugs Act;6
and s. 3(6)(b) of the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.7
As the statutory definition shows, the term “drug” or, “medicinal product” has
strict purposive and functional connotations for “cure” or, “disease prevention” in
humans and animals. This strict legal conception is of significant policy8 and juris-
prudential9 relevance in differentiating a drug from borderline products that are not
stricto sensus drugs, despite their possible therapeutic effects. These include para-
pharmaceutical products such as personal hygiene and cosmetic products, func-
tional foods, and foodstuffs.10 For example, the Indian Drugs and Cosmetic Act
expressly differentiates ayurvedic medicine from the conventional drug,11 while
legislative constructs of “drug” in the European Union, Canada, and the United
5 See the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, U.S.C. tit. 21 s. 321(g)(1) (1938), as
am. 2002. It defines drugs as articles, other than food, that are meant to be used in
diagnosis, cures, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other
animals.
6 See Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, s.2. It defines “drug” as follows: “drug
includes any substance or mixture of substances manufactured, sold or represented for
use in (a) the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder or
abnormal physical state, or its symptoms, in human beings or animals, (b) restoring,
correcting or modifying organic functions in human beings or animals, or (c) disinfec-
tion in premises in which food is manufactured, prepared or kept.”
7 See The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 Act No. 23 of 1940 as amended. It defines
“drug” as all medicines intended for the treatment, diagnosis and prevention of diseases
in human beings and animals. “Drug” has been branded as an essential commodity
since 1955. See section 2(iv) of The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 No. 10 of 1955.
8 Special policy and regulatory decisions regarding production, safety, distribution, and
sales are especially targeted at drugs. Distinctions are made between prescription drugs
that cannot be sold across the counter and patent medicines that can freely be sold over
the counter without a physician’s prescription. In the European Union for example,
Directive 2001/83/EC sets out a broad range of rules concerning production, marketing
and distribution of medicinal products (including labeling, packaging and advertising
rules).
9 The courts have had to define “drug” or “medicinal product” in a number of civil and
criminal cases. In Europe, examples of such cases by the European Court of Justice are
E.C.J., 30 November 1983, van Bennekom case 227/82, E.C.R 1983, 3902; E.C.J., 16
April 1991, Upjohn, case C-112/89, E.C.R., 1991, I-1741, r. 17; 21.
10 For discussion, see Stefaan Callens et al., Chapters on Pharmaceutical Law, (Antwer-
pen, Groningen & Oxford, Intersentia: 2000) at 3.
11 See s. 3(2)(a) of the Indian Drugs and Cosmetic Act, 1940, supra note 7. It defines
Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs separately from conventional drugs as including “all
medicines intended for internal or external use for or in the diagnosis, treatment, miti-
gation or prevention of disease or disorder in human beings or animals, and manufac-
tured exclusively in accordance with the formulae described in the authoritative books
of Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani Tibb systems of medicine, specified in the First
Schedule.”
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States expressly differentiate “drug” from cosmetics and foodstuffs.12 However,
despite statutory distinctions between drug and other para-pharmaceutical products,
the differences are often not as clear-cut in real life, and courts have had to decide
whether or not a product or substance falls within the statutory remit of “drug” or
“medicinal product.”13
Aspirin, the world’s first synthetic drug, was introduced in 1897.14 It is the
precursor of a string of innovative life-saving drugs that are currently on the cusp
of genomics revolution.15 However, innovative drugs are at a premium and invaria-
bly take several years to manufacture.16 It has been observed that the characteristi-
cally extensive pre-clinical and clinical trials preceding drug approval and market
12 For example, the third recital of the European Union Directive 65/65/EEC on medici-
nal products, supra note 4, puts foodstuffs and hygienic products outside of its regula-
tory remit. They are, however, subject to a different regulation under Council Directive
76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States on cosmetics. See
Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to cosmetics, O.J., L 262/169, 27 September 1976. The Directive defines
cosmetics as “any substance or preparation intended for placing in contact with the
various external parts of the human body (epidermis, hair system, nails, lips and exter-
nal genital organs) or with the teeth and the mucous membranes of the oral cavity with
a view exclusively or principally to cleaning them, perfuming them or protecting them
in order to keep them in good condition, change their appearance or correct body
odors.” Ibid.
13 In the European Union, for example, the European Court of Justice has had to make
recourse to certain criteria in determining whether or not a substance is a medicinal
product. These include the article’s manner of production, its function, its pharmaco-
logical properties in the context of current scientific knowledge, its usage, the extent to
which the article is sold, and consumers’ familiarity with the article. See generally Ar-
ticle 1 of Directive 65/65/EEC supra note 4; van Bennekom’s case, supra note 9 at 17;
Upjohn, case C-112/89, E.C.R., supra note 9 at 18. In Upjohn, the Court held, inter
alia, that any substance capable of having an effect on the actual functioning of the
body is a medicinal product. Ibid. at 21.
14 See Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries: A
Twentieth Century History, (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate 2003) at 89.
15 See Arti K. Rai, “The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing In-
novation Incentives, Costs, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era” (2001) University of
Illinois Law Review at 174-175. The author canvasses the theory that the application of
genomics science to pharmaceuticals production could potentially usher in a new era of
pharmaceutical innovation defined by efficient, faster targeting and analysis of genes,
proteins, and biochemical pathways that cause particular diseases.
16 See Arthur Lim, Global Medical Dilemma, Health Cost: The Billion Dollar Crisis of
the 21st Century (Singapore: Continental Press Ltd., 2001) at 20.
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debut,17 and the huge costs of advertising,18 are considerably upping prescription
drug overheads.19 The cumulative costs are invariably passed on to consumers,
with the effects that the poor and the uninsured are priced out of the market.20
Market trappings also shape a disproportionate focus of pharmaceuticals research
and development on diseases that are prevalent in rich countries with the most com-
mercial promise, relative to diseases endemic in poor-resource and low-income
17 See William Francis Crowley Jr., “Drug Development and clinical research in the UK”
(2007) 369 The Lancet, online: The Lancet <http://www.thelancet.com>; Michael A.
Santoro, “Introduction to Part I” in Michael A. Santoro & Thomas M. Gorrie, eds.,
Ethics and the Pharmaceutical Industry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005) at 15 (notes that long and large clinical trials contribute considerably to drug
overheads); Michael D. Rawlins, “Cutting the cost of drug development?” (2004) 3
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery at 360–364.
18 In 2006, for example, the United States pharmaceutical industry spent approximately
$12 billion on advertising and marketing ($5 billion and $7 billion on DTC and profes-
sional spending respectively). See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, New Medicine, New Hope, 2007 Annual Report, (Washington: August 2007)
at 13; Thomas Abrams, “The Regulation of Prescription Drug Promotion” in Michael
A. Santoro & Thomas M. Gorrie, eds., Ethics and the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra
note 17 at 153–168 (notes the spiraling expenditures for prescription drug promotion);
Catherine Matraves, “Market Structure, R&D and Advertising in the Pharmaceutical
Industry” (1999) 47:2 The Journal of Industrial Economics at 169–194 (notes that phar-
maceutical was both R&Dx and advertising intensive).
19 Note the countervailing argument that advertising decreases rather than increases drug
prices in: Merrill Matthews, “Who’s Afraid of Pharmaceutical Advertising? A Re-
sponse to a Changing Health Care System” (May 2001) Institute for Policy Innovation,
Policy Report 155 at 16, online: Institute for Policy Innovation <http://www.ipi.org>.
20 See Rai, supra note 15 at 176-177 (the author notes that spiraling prescription drug
costs were particularly problematic for the elderly and the uninsured in the United
States).
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countries.21 The result is an agglomeration of a multitude of debilitating ailments
generically known as “neglected diseases.”22
The aphorism that patent is the engine of innovation23 is arguably truer for
pharmaceuticals than for most technologies.24 Patents grant exclusive monopoly to
pharmaceuticals rights holders, and serve as the critical incentive for crucial invest-
ments in pharmaceutical research and development. In that context, patents are the
de facto building blocks for prescription drug economics.25 This truism is clearly
exemplified by the general reluctance of the pharmaceutical industry to invest in
unpatentable, albeit promising compounds.26 The pharmaceutical industry makes
21 See “A Dose of Innovation: How to Encourage the Development of Drugs for ‘Ne-
glected Diseases’”, Editorial, The Washington Post, (29 March, 2007) at A18 (laments
the endemic incidence of neglected diseases, and welcomes a recent collaboration be-
tween a non-profit organization and Sanofi-Aventis to develop a new anti-malaria
drug); Jurgen Drews, “Drug Research: Between Ethical Demands and Economic Con-
straints” supra note 17 at 21–36 (notes that as the costs of drug R&D spiraled from the
1960s, the mutual coexistence of medical, scientific, and economic motivations for
drug R&D was substituted with strategic targeting of specific markets — those with the
most commercial promise); Michael Perelman, Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of Creativity, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2004) at 140–144 (notes how the market dictates pharmaceutical research focus on dis-
eases that produce the most profits, at the expense of diseases prevalent in poor re-
source countries).
22 Neglected diseases are mainly tropical diseases, ranging from malaria to tuberculosis,
AIDS, leishmaniasis, sleeping sickness, to chagas disease. They are otherwise known
as tropical diseases (TDR), and the World Health Organization for Research and Train-
ing in Tropical Diseases is collaborating with the World Bank and UNDP to establish
affordable and improved treatments. See the World Health Organization for Research
and Training in Tropical Diseases, online: WHO <http://www.who.int/tdr/>.
23 See Paul Herrling, “Patent Sense: Protecting Intellectual Property Saves Lives in the
Developing World” (2007) 449 Nature at 174–175 (notes that a patent is crucial to
securing the massive financial base required for financing innovative pharmaceuticals.
He argues further that, absent a patent, the pharmaceutical industry would be unable to
produce innovative life-saving drugs); Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594
(C.A.Fed. (Pa.), 1985), at 599 (where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit held, inter alia, that patents created incentives for innovation).
24 See John H. Barton, “Intellectual Property, Biotechnology, and International Trade:
Two Examples” in Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., Intellectual Property:
Trade, Competition, and Sustainable Development (Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, 2003) at 285–301 (the author notes that pharmaceutical patent is the
poster child of the patent system, and “the undisputed example of success of the intel-
lectual property system in encouraging innovation”). Ibid. at 286.
25 See Rai, supra note 15 at 177 (notes that prescription drug economics is profoundly
shaped by patent monopoly power, which could extend patentees’ stranglehold on
price, even after the emergence of similar, or me-too drugs).
26 For instance, the pharmaceutical industry is reputedly reluctant to invest in a promis-
ing, but unpatentable, anti-cancer compound. The drug is known as dichloroacetate
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no secret of the patent’s indispensability to the trade. In their 2007 Annual Report,
for instance, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America listed
achieving “strong intellectual property incentives” in the United States and world-
wide as a core policy objective.27
However, there is a proven nexus between patent monopoly and high prices
for pharmaceuticals,28 to the end that generic drugs are notoriously cheaper than
their patented and branded counterparts.29 Nevertheless, undermining pharmaceuti-
cal patents with a view to securing affordable prescription drugs could most cer-
tainly imperil investments in innovative life-saving drugs.30 Herein lays one of the
pharmaceutical policy challenges for governments around the world. Significantly,
the internationalization of the minimum standards for patents protection by the
World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) makes it a lot harder for member states to derogate from pharma-
ceutical patents other than as is possible under the narrowly construed legally al-
lowable exceptions.31
(DCA), and has been used for years to treat a rare metabolic disorder. However, further
clinical trials and research is needed in order to ensure its efficacy and safety for cancer
treatment. As a well-known compound, the drug is unpatentable, making it highly unat-
tractive for the pharmaceutical industry to invest in, and fueling speculations that chari-
ties, universities, and governments, may have to step in to fund expensive clinical tri-
als. See Andy Coghlan, “Cheap, ‘Safe’ Drug Kills Most Cancers” 2587 New Scientist
(20 January 2007) 13; Helen Pearson, “Cancer Patients Opt for Unapproved Drug”
(2007) 446 Nature at 474-475.
27 See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, supra note 18 at 5 (notes
that the strong intellectual property system in the U.S. explains why it produces 70 per
cent of the new drugs that enter the market annually).
28 Patents are deemed crucial for innovative prescription drugs, and patented drugs are
relatively more expensive than out-of-patents generic drugs. See Oxfam, “Fatal Side
Effects: Medicine Patents Under the Microscope” in Brigitte Granville, ed., The Eco-
nomics of Essential Medicines (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002)
at 81–99; Kumariah Balasubramaniam, “Access to Medicines: Patents, Prices and Pub-
lic Policy — Consumer Perspectives” in Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne, eds., Global In-
tellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002) at 90–107.
29 See Aidan Michael Hollis, “How do Brand’s ‘Own Generics’ Affect Pharmaceutical
Prices?” (2005) 27:4 Review of Industrial Organization at 329–350.
30 See David Vaver & Shamnad Basheer, “Popping Patented Pills: Europe and a Decade’s
Dose of TRIPS” (2006) European Intellectual Property Review at 282–291 (the authors
note that the underlying principle driving European patent policy is the conventionally
presumed patents’ indispensability to the survival of the pharmaceutical industry).
31 Intellectual property protection was inexorably linked with trade via the World Trade
Organization’s TRIPS Agreement, signed at Marrakesh in 1994. The Treaty which
took effect in 1995 generally sets the minimum level of protection, while its Article 27
specifically obliges member states to make patent protection available for all kinds of
invention, including pharmaceuticals. Non-compliance could lead to the WTO dispute
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Price regulation offers an ostensibly attractive solution to the spiraling pre-
scription drug prices and, with the exception of the United States, has been fairly
successfully used to rein in prices in most developed countries under national insur-
ance schemes.32 However, the downside of capping prescription drug prices is its
concomitant propensity to stifle investments in innovative life-saving drugs.33 For
example, analysts believe that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry owes much of its
relative competitiveness vis-à-vis its European counterpart, to the lack of an offi-
cially mediated price regime that is prevalent in Europe and other developed econo-
mies.34 Moreover, a regulated price regime will not necessarily deliver all prescrip-
tion drugs needed, as evidenced in Britain, where the national health insurance
scheme often excludes “drugs of last resort” because they are deemed too expen-
sive despite their proven clinical benefits.35
The pertinent considerations, therefore, are how to best resolve the twin
problems of neglected diseases and the spiraling prescription drug costs without
stifling innovative pharmaceuticals. In other words, how best to steer prescription
drug production towards meeting societal health needs, while maintaining a steady
settlement procedure and possible trade sanctions. See the Agreement on Trade-related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April
1994, online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm>;
Donald G. Richards, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism: The Political
Economy of the TRIPS Agreement (New York & London: M.E Sharpe Inc., 2004) at
141–166.
32 With the exception of the United States, pharmaceutical price regulation is used exten-
sively under national health plans in Europe, Canada, and in much of the developed
world in order to rein in run-away prices. See Barton, supra note 24 at 292.
33 See Allan Earl-Slater, “Can We Afford to Lose the Pharmaceutical Industry in the
EU?” (1996) 96:4 European Business Review at 18–25 (the author argues that Europe
was losing its competitiveness in the pharmaceutical industry due to price control).
34 See Madhu Agrawal, Global Competitiveness in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Ef-
fect of National, Regulatory, Economic, and Market Factors (New York & London:
Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1999) at 18–20, 33–35 (notes that the European phar-
maceutical firms were less competitive vis-à-vis the U.S. due to price regulation policy,
which the U.S. does not have).
35 For instance, in 2007, the United Kingdom medicine watchdog, the National Institute
for Clinical Effectiveness, rejected a “last resort” drug (Abatacept) for the debilitating
condition of severe arthritis. Although the watchdog found that the drug showed strong
evidence of clinical benefit, it found its price for an average dose, at 9,333 pounds per
person per year, too expensive. See Jeremy Laurance, “Arthritis Sufferers’ Anger as
Drug is Denied on NHS” The Independent (26 October, 2007), online: The Indepen-
dent <http://news.independent.co.uk/health/article3098865.ece>; Merrill Matthews,
“Prices, Profits and Prescriptions: The Pharmatech Industry in the New Economy”
(2000) Institute for Policy Innovation, Policy Report 157 at 8-9 (notes that European
countries routinely ration, and would often refuse to pay for, expensive prescription
drugs).
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stream of innovative life-saving medicines. Drawing on empirical data and relevant
literature, the article proffers workable policy options, while critically reviewing
the legal and socio-economic externalities that underpin current monocultural and
market orientated prescription drug economics. The article highlights the inherent
weaknesses in the current global pharmaceutical production regime, and canvasses
for its supplementation with a normative, non-market oriented, internationally coor-
dinated, pharmaceuticals production paradigm that is cognizant of societal health
needs.
The article is divided into six parts. Part one deals with the introduction, part
two discusses the evolution of modern medicine and the socio-economic dynamics
that shape the current prescription drug economics, part three discusses the pharma-
ceutical costs conundrum, part four analyses neglected diseases and the scale of the
problem, part five discusses the role of patents on the pharmaceuticals costs trajec-
tory and reviews literature on possible alternatives to promoting incentives for
pharmaceuticals R&D, and part six sums up the discourse and reiterates the solu-
tions to the problems identified.
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG ECONOMICS
An analysis and review of the evolution and history of modern medicine is
crucial to understanding the legal and socio-economic dynamics that shape the cur-
rent market oriented pharmaceuticals production paradigm. The history of drug dis-
covery and development is synonymous with the history of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry itself. However, the idea that illnesses could be averted is ancient, and
predates orthodox medicine.36 But, at that early time, treatments of illnesses were
steeped in religious and magical practices.37 These practices have tarried and are
still tenaciously held on to in places like Africa and Latin America, where voodoo
practices abound, and where sorcery and witchcraft are inexorably linked to ill-
nesses and cures.38 For instance, some 70 per cent of South Africans still consult
36 For instance, acupuncture is an integral component of Chinese healthcare, which dates
back at least 2,500 years. See National Institutes of Health Consensus Development
Statement, online: Health World Online
<http://www.healthy.net/LIBRARY/Articles/NIH/Report.htm>; M. Weatherall, In
Search of a Cure: A History of Pharmaceutical Discovery (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990) at 3.
37 For instance, the mythological Asklepios, better known in Latin as Aesculapius, was
the head of a cult of temple-medicine to which the sick could go for medical treatment.
See ibid. Moreover, belief in witchcraft and its association with illness, death and cure
is rife. It is believed that witches and sorcerers can inflict illnesses and cures. See
“Does Witchcraft Deserve a Bad Name?” BBC News (6 August 2004), online: BBC
News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3538912.stm>.
38 See, online: Voodoo: From Medicine to Zombies
<http://www.nando.net/prof/caribe/voodoo.html>. The website has a detailed descrip-
tion of Voodoo altars, and a mythological dictionary.
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 traditional healers — an estimate of about 200,000 people.39 In Thailand, the
proliferation of faith healers prompted the government to establish a register of
faith healers in 2004 in order to educate people on the rights and wrongs of super-
natural beliefs.40
However, Hippocrates of Cos championed a more rational approach to medi-
cal practice by concentrating on observation and experience, thereby eschewing re-
ligion and magic.41 The recognition or discovery of the healing properties of me-
dicinal plants ushered in the “age of the botanicals”,42 and greatly radicalized
medical practice.43
Evidence of actual usage of medicinal plants in early times abound. For in-
stance, the curative effect of foxglove on certain diseases was an integral part of
European plant folklore, while the use of glycoside yielding plants and toad’s skin
39 In 2004, the South African Parliament passed a bill to regulate the country’s bur-
geoning traditional healers. See “Healers Licensed in South Africa: A Bill to Regulate
South Africa’s 200,000 Traditional Healers has been Adopted by Parliament” BBC
News (9 September 2004), online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3640270.stm>.
40 See Simon Montlake, “Thai to curb supernatural excess” BBC News (13 October
2004), online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/3740830.stm>.
41 Hippocrates introduced the ideas of different temperaments based on four “humors”
associated with the body: fluid essences named the sanguine, the phlegmatic, the chol-
eric, and the melancholic. According to Weatherall, these terms have had influence on
medical practice till date. Aristotle refined the idea after his observation of dissected
animals. He classified the special properties of living organisms into hot, cold, wet, and
dry. These resonated with Hippocrates’ humors, and persisted until the growth of mod-
ern chemistry. See Weatherall, supra note 36 at 3.
42 See John C. Somberg, “The Evolving Drug Discovery and Development Process” in
Peter G. Welling, Louis Lasagna, & Umesh V. Banakar, eds., The Drug Development
Process: Increasing Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness (New York: Marcel Dekker Inc.,
1996) at 3.
43 Ibid. at 4. For instance, the following plant drugs were known before 1800: Opium
from Papaver somniferum was discovered in ancient Greece and used for pain relief;
Hemlock from Conium maculatum was discovered in ancient Greece and used for state
poison; Mandragora from Mandragora officinatum was discovered in ancient Greece,
and used for soporific magic; Belladonna from Atropa belladonna, discovered in 1500
and used as a cosmetic and poison; Ipecacuanha from Cephaelis ipecacuanha was dis-
covered in Brazil in 1600 and used for bloody fluxes; Jesuit’s Bark from Cinchona
species was discovered in Peru in 1630 and used for tertian and quartan agues; Coca
leaves from Erythroxylon coca, were discovered in Bolivia and Peru in 1688 and used
to prevent fatigue; Ma-Huang from Ephedra species was discovered in China BC and
the U.S. in 1924 and used for asthma and as a stimulant; Foxglove from Digitalis spe-
cies was discovered in England in 1775 and used for dropsy and heart disease. See
Weatherall, supra note 36 at 4.
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for medicinal purposes goes back to ancient Egypt.44 The practice currently pro-
vides a limited alternative to orthodox medicine, and is popularly referred to as
herbal medicine.45 It is axiomatic that the use of botanicals was the first step in
modern drug discovery and development,46 and that botanicals are still indispensa-
ble to modern medicine,47 as evidenced by the current bioprospecting activities of
pharmaceutical companies.48 Moreover, the use of traditional knowledge about the
medicinal properties of plants and other genetic resources has yielded most conven-
tional plant-based pharmaceuticals.49 In fact, the modality for the protection of
44 Somberg, supra note 42 at 4; See also Stephen Pain, “The Pharaoh’s Pharmacists” New
Scientist (15 December 2007), at 40–43 (reports on the findings that 64 per cent of
prescriptions made in ancient Egypt had therapeutic value at par with drugs used in the
past 50 years).
45 Its wide usage has been documented and researched by medical scholars. See N.K.
Mubiru, O.W. Maganyi & D.D. Soejarto, “Strength from Traditions: A Selection of
Medicinal and Toxic Plants of Uganda for a Joint Public Health Effort” in John R.
Stepp, Felice S. Wyndham & Rebecca K. Zarger, eds., Ethnobiology and Biocultural
Diversity (Athens, Georgia: The International Society of Ethnobiology, 2002) at 229;
Joerg Gruenwald, “The Emerging Role of Herbal Medicine in Health Care in Europe”
(1998) 32:1 Drug Information Journal at 151–153.
46 The isolation and characterization of plant-based compounds facilitated the scientific
use of plant-based remedies that had hitherto been exploited as drugs themselves. See
Jacalyn Duffin, History of Medicine: A Scandalously Short Introduction, (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2001) at 3.
47 For instance, pharmaceuticals global sales are worth an estimated US$300 billion annu-
ally. Of these figures, botanical pharmaceuticals account for between US$75 billion
and US$150 billion. See Kate & Laird, supra note 2 at 9. The botanical medicine in-
dustry has been projected to rise by 10–20 per cent in most countries. Ibid.
48 For example, Merck, Pfizer, and other giant pharmaceutical companies have made it
their corporate policy to discover and develop pharmaceuticals from botanical sources.
They often form special alliances with botanical gardens and biodiversity-rich coun-
tries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. See Padmashree Gehl Sampath, Regulating
Bioprospecting: Institutions For Drug Research, Access And Benefit Sharing, (Tokyo,
New York & Paris: United Nations University Press, 2005) at 1–11. However, biopros-
pecting is often derided by critics as “biopiracy”. For instance, India, China, Brazil, and
nine other countries of the world’s most biodiverse countries signed an alliance on 18
February 2002 to fight biopiracy and ensure the preservation of their peoples’ right to
their genetic resources. See Virginia Gewin, “Poor Nations Seek New Biodiversity
Deal” (2002) 415 Nature at 949; Vandana Shiva, “Biopiracy: The Theft of Knowledge
and Resources” in Brian Tokar, ed., Re-designing Life? The Worldwide Challenge to
Genetic Engineering, (New York: Zed Books 2001) at 283–289.
49 See Kate & Laird, supra note 2 at 61. It is said that, of the 120 pharmaceutical products
derived from plants in 1985, 75 per cent were discovered through the study of their
traditional medical use. Ibid.
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traditional knowledge of medicinal plant cultivation and uses is now a recurring
subject of legal scholarship and institutional discourse.50
The advent of chemistry marked a significant paradigm shift in drug develop-
ment, as emphasis shifted from botany to the exploration of chemical substances as
a new frontier of drug development. The publication of the first pharmacopoeia, De
Materia Medica in 1839-40,51 epitomized this paradigm shift.52 Plant and animal
substances were isolated and purified, and found to contain carbon, hydrogen, oxy-
gen and other elements.53 For instance, quinine, an effective malaria drug, was iso-
lated from cinchona bark in 1820 at the Royal College of Chemistry in London.54
Attempts to produce the drug synthetically failed55until the 1944 breakthrough in
Germany.56 This phase marked the beginning of what became organic chemistry.57
The discovery of dyes spurred new findings of chemicals,58 and the dyestuff indus-
50 See Madhavi Sunder, “The Invention of Traditional Knowledge” (2007) 70 Law &
Contemporary Problems at 119; Peter-Tobias Stoll & Anja von Hahn, “Indigenous
Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in International Law” in
Silke von Lewinski, ed., Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property: Genetic Re-
sources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (The Hague, London & New York:
2004) at 29–43; WIPO Report on Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and
Traditional Knowledge (1998-1999), WIPO Publication No. 768E, ISBN 92-805-0968-
3, at 1; Peter Drahos, “Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a
Global Bio-Collecting Society the Answer?”(2000) 6 European Intellectual Property
Review at 245–250.
51 This comprised a list of 600 drugs and discussed how to acquire and prepare them. See
Jonathan Pereira, Elements of Materia Medica and Therapeutics (London: Longman,
1839-40).
52 See E.J Shellard, “The Life and Work of Jonathan Pereira 1804–1853” (1981) 227
Pharmaceutical Journal at 631–3. Pereira identified four ways by which medicinal ef-
fects could be ascertained: first, by the sensible qualities of medicines; second, by the
natural historical properties; third, by the chemical properties; and fourth, by the dy-
namical properties. See Weatherall, supra note 36 at 19.
53 Ibid.
54 The experiment was performed by Pelletier and Caventou, and the composition was
eventually established. Ibid.
55 Ibid. The nineteenth century experienced some major pharmacological breakthroughs,
especially in the purification of the active ingredients of plant-based drugs. Pharmacists
and doctors were able to sell and administer powerful alkaloid substances such as mor-
phine, codeine, quinine and cocaine whose purity, strength and dosage could now be
regulated. See Roy Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Hu-
manity from Antiquity to the Present, 1st American Edition, (New York: W. W. Nor-
ton, 1998) at 304.
56 See R.B. Turner & R.B. Woodward, “The Chemistry of Cinchona Alkaloids” in R.H.F.
Manske & H.L. Holmes, eds., The Alkaloids: Chemistry and Physiology, vol. 3 (New
York: Academic Press, 1953) at 1–63.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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try soon gave way to drug production, especially in Germany and Switzerland.59
Bayer, a German chemical company, was arguably the world’s first modern phar-
maceutical company, when in 1888 it marketed an anti-pyretic drug that was sold
as Phenatin.60 By 1897, aspirin had been introduced as the world’s first synthetic
pharmaceutical.61 The existence of viable chemical industries was the critical linch-
pin for the subsequent growth and development of the pharmaceutical industry.62
In fact, modern medicine has been dated from 1928 when Alexander Fleming dis-
covered penicillin,63 while the birth of modern research-based pharmaceutical in-
dustry has been anchored in the 1930s when Prontosil and Penicillin were first
commercialized.64 The advent of biotechnology opened up access to new com-
pounds from human proteins other than the traditional sources of soil collection and
organic chemistry.65 Currently on the cusps of genomics revolution, the industry is
primed for greater efficiency in drug research and development.66
59 Ibid.
60 See Dutfield, supra note 14 at 89. While commenting on Bayer’s feat and its signifi-
cance as the template for future pharmaceutical companies, Charles Mann and Mark
Plummer said as follows: “For the first time, a drug had been conceived, developed,
tested, and marketed, all by a private company. It marked the creation of the modern
drug industry, the marriage of science and business that has transformed this century,
making huge profits even as it saves lives.” See Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer,
The Aspirin Wars: Money, Medicine, and 100 years of Rampant Competition, (New
York: Knopf, 1991) at 10.
61 See Dutfield, supra note 14 at 89.
62 Many of the chemical companies in Germany and Switzerland found out that the tech-
nology for making synthetic dyes was easily transferable to pharmaceuticals. This led
to the production of a new number of pharmaceuticals between 1908 and World War
II. See Agrawal, supra note 34 at 2–4.
63 Alexander Fleming was a Scottish Microbiologist. He had been searching for years for
a therapeutic agent that could kill bacteria without harming the tissue of the host. While
he was on vacation, a green mold had drifted in through the window of his laboratory
at St. Mary’s Hospital in London, contaminating a culture growing in one of his Petri
dishes. To his surprise, he found that microbes on the mold were sucking up the bacte-
ria. Fleming named the germ-fighting contaminant penicillin. In October 1945 Alexan-
der Fleming, Howard Florey & Ernst Chain were awarded the Nobel Prize in medicine.
See Linda Marsa, Prescription for Profits: How the Pharmaceutical Industry Bankrol-
led the Unholy Marriage Between Science and Business (New York: Scribner, 1997) at
22.
64 See Carsten Fink, Intellectual Property Rights, Market Structure, and Transnational
Corporations in Developing Countries (Berlin: Mensch & Buch Verlag, 2000) at 123.
65 See Barton, supra note 24 at 286 (the author notes that biotechnology has changed both
the research and structural paradigm of the pharmaceutical industry by enabling a shift
from reliance on traditional compounds sourced from organic chemistry and soil col-
lection, to human proteins).
66 See Arti K. Rai, “Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan Drugs, and Distributive Jus-
tice: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis” (2002) 19:2 Social Philosophy & Policy at
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A notable feature of this narrative is that pharmaceutical innovation is histori-
cally transnational, co-operative, incremental and cumulative. This is exemplified
by the 1820 isolation of quinine, a malaria drug, from cinchona bark in London by
the Royal College of Chemistry, and its subsequent synthesis in Germany in
1944.67 However, the co-operative element of modern pharmaceutical R&D has
been radically redefined by proprietary rights via the instrumentality of the patents
regime.68 A classic example for which patent is the critical linchpin is the public
private partnerships, a pharmaceutical research and development paradigm, pre-
mised on co-operation between publicly funded research institutions and the phar-
maceutical industry.69
(a) Strength in Numbers: The Transnational and Mega-Pharmaceutical
Industry
One of the fundamentals of prescription drug economics is the pharmaceutical
industry’s transnational presence.70 In spite of the concentration of the largest phar-
maceutical companies in relatively few countries,71 establishment of international
manufacturing outposts in nations that import pharmaceuticals is rife and crucial to
achieving desired economies of scale.72 For instance, Pfizer reputedly had twenty-
246 (posits that the mapping of the human, and over one hundred animal genomes, has
yielded an exponential increase in data on genes, proteins, and biochemical pathways
associated with various diseases that could be manipulated and specifically targeted by
designer drugs, thus improving drug efficiency).
67 See R.B. Turner & R.B. Woodward, “The Chemistry of Cinchona Alkaloids” in R.H.F.
Manske & H.L. Holmes, eds., The Alkaloids: Chemistry and Physiology, vol. 3 (New
York: Academic Press, 1953) at 1–63.
68 See Janet Hope, Biobazaar: The Open Source Revolution and Biotechnology (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2008) at 28–67
(the author notes that while patents have been instrumental to the dramatic privatization
of biotechnology and its phenomenal growth from the early 1980s, they may also have
hindered innovations in the field, resulting in a “tragedy of the anticommons”).
69 See Ron A. Bouchard & Trudo Lemmens, “Privatizing Biomedical Research: A Third
Way” (2008) 26:1 Nature Biotechnology at 31–38 (the authors observe that the wave
of privatization that swept the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in the 1990s was predi-
cated on the twin pillars of transnational research and public-private partnerships). Ibid.
at 31.
70 See Bouchard & Lemmens, supra note 69 at 31 (the authors note that transnational
research is an integral pillar of modern pharmaceuticals R&D); Agrawal, supra note 34
at 1.
71 See Stuart O. Schweitzer, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy (Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997) at 12.
72 Economies of scale refers to the costs saved by a firm as a result of expansion. Typi-
cally, but not necessarily, when a firm increases its output, the total costs of input de-
creases with consequential savings. See Joachim Silvestre, “Economies and Disecon-
omy of Scale” in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman, eds., The New
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one manufacturing plants located in developing countries, with four out of its six
R&D laboratories located outside of the United States.73 This is further exemplified
in Mexico, which is home to almost all of the major multinational research-based
pharmaceutical companies producing 84 per cent of the total value of Mexican
pharmaceutical sales in 2003 and investing an estimated $200 million in 2004.74
Similarly, crucial research and development activities are often carried out outside
of a firm’s national borders by foreign surrogates or affiliates, as typified by the
Pfizer business model and explicated by the Mexican case. For instance, in 1994,
an estimated $4.5 billion worth of pharmaceutical R&D was executed in the United
States by affiliates of foreign firms mainly from the United Kingdom and Switzer-
land, and $1.9 billion worth of R&D was executed outside of the United States by
foreign associates of U.S. pharmaceutical firms.75 Moreover, the industry also
owes its trans-nationality to periodic mergers and acquisitions, often necessitated
by competitiveness imperatives.76 For example, GlaxoSmithKline evolved through
mergers and acquisitions to become the second-largest pharmaceutical company in
the world.77
Although the pharmaceutical industry has a transnational presence, it tends to
concentrate in certain regions of the world; the United States, Canada, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Sweden, and Japan.78 The in-
dustry’s locational disequilibrium has been attributed to its inherent competitive-
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 2 (London & New York: Macmillan and
Stockton, 1987) at 80–84.
73 See Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowl-
edge Economy (New York: The New Press, 2002) at 66.
74 See Pierre Moise & Elizabeth Docteur, Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement
Policies in Mexico OECD Health Working Papers No. 25,
DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2007) 1(13 February, 2007), 1–65, at 35.
75 See Barton, supra note 24 at 290.
76 Mergers in the industry are imperative for a stronger financial base for the capital-
intensive R&D, and for thwarting impediments generated by the inherent competition
in the industry. See Somberg, supra note 42 at 11. Most often, the mergers or acquisi-
tions transcend firms’ nationalities. For instance, in 2000, Glaxo Wellcome, a UK firm,
merged with SmithKline Beecham, which was jointly owned by UK and U.S. firms.
Other firms that merged between 1989 and 2000 were: in 1989, Dow (US) and Marion
(US); Bristol-Myers (US) and Squibb (US); in 1990, Rhone-Poulenc (France) and
Rorer (US); Roche (Swiss) and Genentech (US); in 1996, Ciba-Geigy (Swiss) and San-
doz (Swiss) merged to form Novatis; in 1999, Hoechst (Germany) and Rhone-Poulenc
(France) merged to form Aventis; Astra (Swedish) and Zeneca (UK). See G. Owen,
From Empire to Europe: The Decline and Revival of British Industry Since the Second
World War (London: HarperCollins, 1999) at 382.
77 See GlaxoSmithKline, Annual Report, “Answering the Questions That Matter” (2007),
online: GlaxoSmithKline <http://www.gsk.com/investors/reps07/annual-report-
2007.pdf>.
78 See Owen, supra note 76 at 382.
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ness in those countries, relative to that in other regions of the world.79 The compet-
itive advantages that pharmaceutical firms gain from being in these regions range
from the ability to develop innovative products, to the availability of sound infra-
structure and finance for research and development, to auspicious regulatory
framework.80
Barring entry barriers such as shortage of skilled labour or weak finances,81 it
is axiomatic that every country would prefer to produce all its pharmaceutical
needs locally.82 The advantages to the real prospects of kick-starting an industrial
economy are very obvious, ranging from adequate provision for local health care
needs, an R&D focus on country-specific diseases, assured employment in the
pharmaceutical sector, adequate quality control of pharmaceuticals production
processes, and foreign exchange augmentation with pharmaceuticals exports.83
However, because the industry is technology intensive,84 few countries have
the technological resources to truly compete.85 As noted earlier, while research-
based foreign firms produced 84 per cent of Mexican pharmaceuticals in 2003,
Mexican firms were confined to producing generics and patented copy drugs.86
Nevertheless, it has been posited that, despite skeptical views to the contrary, least
developed countries, that lack pharmaceutical local production capacity, could ben-
efit from the new exceptions and flexibility in the WTO TRIPS Agreement to es-
79 See Agrawal, supra note 34 at 8–38; John K. Iglehart, “Good Science and the Market-
place for Drugs: A Conversation with Jean-Pierre Garnier” (2003) 22:4 Health Affairs
at 119–127.
80 See Agrawal, ibid.
81 See Mirjam Schiffer & Beatrice Weder, “Firm Size and the Business Environment:
Worldwide Survey Results.” International Finance Corporation, World Bank Paper No.
43 (2001), online: International Finance Corporation
<http://ifcln1.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/dp43/$FILE/dp43.pdf>.
82 See Warren Kaplan & Richard Laing, “Local Production of Pharmaceuticals: Industrial
Policy and Access to Medicines: An Overview of Key Concepts, Issues, and Opportu-
nities for Future Research” Health, Nutrition, and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper
No. 32036 (January 2005). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment/The World Bank (the authors note that local production of pharmaceuticals by
many countries would not necessarily lead to improved access due to the consequential
reduction in the economies of scale).
83 See Gary Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1983) at 167.
84 See Agrawal, supra note 34 at 1–38.
85 Some developing countries, notably India, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Mexico,
and China have been able to reverse engineer and manufacture generics drugs, which
require less intensive pharmaceutical technological wherewithal. See Balasub-
ramaniam, supra note 28 at 90–107.
86 See Moise & Docteur, supra note 74 at 35.
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tablish a Mexican or Indian type generic pharmaceutical production base.87 En-
hanced capability for local generics production could potentially make prescription
drugs cheaper and thus, affordable88 and open the door to mainstream pharmaceuti-
cal production in the long term. Although not all countries are involved in pharma-
ceutical manufacturing, most brand names have morphed into global household
names, and pharmaceuticals are now truly ubiquitous public goods. From the com-
mon antibiotic to the complex AIDS drug, their ubiquity is a testament to their
indispensability and the commonality of humanity’s quest for adequate health
care.89
(b)  Public-Private Partnerships: Should Pricing Reflect Public Money
in Privately Owned Pharmaceuticals?
Although the modern pharmaceutical industry depends largely on private eq-
uity funding for R&D activities,90 public private partnerships and a collaborative
87 See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, “The Doha Round’s Public Health
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the
Amended TRIPS Provisions” (2007) 10:4 Journal of International Economic Law at
921–987 (notes that despite skepticism, least developing countries could use TRIPS’s
flexibility and the comparative advantages provided to them by biogenetic diversity
and traditional knowledge to establish viable local generic pharmaceutical production
before the 2016 TRIPS deadline for enforcement of pharmaceutical patents: at 978).
88 For example, India is said to be building on the critical mass of its generic drug produc-
tion to an established research-based pharmaceutical industry. See Padmashree Gehl
Sampath, “India’s Product Patent Protection Regime: Less or More of ‘Pills for the
Poor’?” (2006) 9:6 The Journal of World Intellectual Property at 694-726 (notes that
Indian pharmaceutical firms produced 22 per cent of all generic drugs worldwide.
However, foresees that the introduction of product patents protection in 2005 will have
mostly likely lead to a decline in the output of the generic drugs. Indian pharmaceutical
firms have thus commenced investing in R&D, which had grown from US$80 million
in 2001 to US$170 million in 2004: at 700–702).
89 Health is a basic human need. Good health is no less important than good food. The
right to health has even been viewed as a key human right. For a discussion, see
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, “The Right to Health in International Law: Its Implica-
tions for the Obligations of State and Non-State Actors in Ensuring Access to Essential
Medicines.” (2003) 19:3 South African Journal on Human Rights at 541; Zita Laz-
zarini, “Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options under TRIPS and
the case of Brazil” (2003) 6 Yale Human Rights & Law Development Law Journal at
117-118 (Lazzarini posits that a careful reader will not find “[no] right to access to
pharmaceuticals” in the International Bill of Human Rights or in any subsequent mod-
ern human rights instruments. However, such obligation - although not a defined
human right itself — is firmly grounded in the implications of existing substantive pro-
visions and in the special needs created by the current circumstances); Ibid.
90 See Carlos Maria Correa, “Ownership of Knowledge: the Role of Patents in Pharma-
ceutical R&D” (2004) 82:10 Bulletin of the World Health Organization at 784–787
(notes that private firms invest the largest part of global funds for pharmaceutical
R&D).
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new drug research and production paradigm between publicly funded research in-
stitutions and the pharmaceutical industry is an integral element of prescription
drug economics.91 Notable pioneering and breakthrough innovative drugs are often
rooted in basic research conducted at publicly funded universities in Canada, Eu-
rope and the United States.92 In the U.S. for example, universities conducting basic
research for new drugs are often funded by the National Institutes of Health
(NIH),93 although the universities do hold patent rights, and can commercialize
their basic research under the Bayh-Dole Act.94 Specifically, the NIH’s contribu-
tions to the U.S. pharmaceutical industry drug development programs in 2005,
2006 and 2007, were $28.7 billion, $28.5 billion, and $28.6 billion respectively.95
In Canada, the U.S. style public-private partnerships research paradigm for
new pharmaceuticals was formalized in 2000, when the Canadian Institutes for
Health Research (CIHR) was established.96 An equivalent of the U.S. National In-
stitutes of Health, the CIHR has a mandate to organize, co-coordinate, and fund
health research at the Federal level, and ensure the commercialization of publicly
91 See Bouchard & Lemmens, supra note 69 at 31; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Public Re-
search and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-
Sponsored Research” (1996) 82 Virginia Law Review at 1663-1727 (reviews the his-
tory of the legal framework that facilitated the transfer of publicly funded research
results from the public domain to private industry for commercialization via the instru-
mentality of patents licensing and technological transfer agreements in the United
States).
92 See Dutfield, supra note 14 at 98, 102 (the author notes that governments often fund a
great deal of basic pharmaceutical research; especially in the United Sates, the industry
has benefited tremendously both from direct government funding, and collaborations
with publicly funded universities); Barton, supra note 24 at 286.
93 See Eric G. Campbell et al., “Inside the Triple Helix: Technology Transfer and Com-
mercialization in the Life Sciences” (2004) 23:1 Health Affairs at 64–76; Barton, supra
note 24 at 286.
94 See University and Small Business Patent Procedures P.L. 95–517, 12 December 1980,
codified at Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. ss. 200–212 (2004); Radio Broadcast with Pro-
fessor Paul A. David, “Innovation and the Role of Universities in Commercializing
Research Results” (2006) 2 University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology, & Pol-
icy 101 at 103 (notes that wealth creation was injected into the U.S. universities’ objec-
tives by the Bayh-Dole Act); William M. Sage, “Funding Fairness: Public Investment,
Proprietary Rights and Access to Health Care Technology” (1996) 82 University of
Virginia Law Review at 1737–1752 and 1749 (notes that the Bayh-Dole Act was instru-
mental to the development of strategic alliances between academics and industry, and
that the former had earned large sums from patents royalties and joint venture
payments).
95 See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Indus-
try’s Profile 2007, (Washington DC: PhRMA, March 2007) at 2.
96 See Canadian Institutes of Health Research Act, R.S.C. c. 6 (2000) as am. 2006. The
CIHR was a successor of the Medical Research Council of Canada.
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funded research through patents licensure to pharmaceutical companies.97 On the
contrary, the UK does not have the Bayh-Dole or CIHR type legislation. Perhaps,
this partly accounts for the relative lack of enthusiasm for research commercializa-
tion expressed by the UK higher education sector. For instance, 26 per cent of UK
universities had no formal policy of intellectual property exploitation,98 while 90
per cent were more interested in publishing research in order to improve research
assessment exercise ratings rather than applying for patents.99 Nevertheless, the
UK has a government-backed technology transfer policy, albeit with weak, but ben-
eficial Bayh-Dole effects for UK universities and research institutions.100
Generally, collaborations between publicly funded research institutions and
for-profit private technological companies are often mutually beneficial.101 For in-
stance, in the 2006 financial year, U.S. academic centers received $45 billion of
public money in research funding,102 while joint public-private collaborative re-
search efforts in the U.S. led to the introduction of 697 new products into the mar-
ket, the launching of 553 new start-up companies, and the management of 12,672
licenses and options.103 Specifically, biopharmaceuticals public-private collabora-
tive research efforts often lead to breakthrough prescription drugs. A notable exam-
ple is Xalatan, the best selling eye drop for Glaucoma, which originated from basic
research conducted at the laboratory of Columbia University in the 1970s, aided by
a $4 million National Institutes of Health grant.104 The Xalatan example typifies
the collaborative public private partnerships drug research paradigm, between non-
profit publicly funded research universities and the profit-orientated pharmaceutical
industry.
97 See Ron A. Bouchard, “Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercializa-
tion of Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Govern-
ment Royalty Fees?” (2007) 13:2 Boston University Journal of Science & Technology
Law at 120–192 (the author notes that commercialization and public-private partner-
ships are central to the CIHR mandate). Bouchard, ibid. at 122-123.
98 See Hannah Fearn, “A Penny for Your Thoughts: Academics are at the Very Heart of
the Knowledge Economy, but Just How Far Should They and Their Institutions Go in
the Commercial Exploitation of Their Ideas?” Times Higher Education (28 February–5
March 2008) at 31–35.
99 Ibid. at 31.
100 See Mark Van Hoorebeek, “Government Policy and University Technology Transfer
Practices in the UK” (2005) 4:4 International Journal of Technology Transfer and
Commercialization at 500-517.
101 See Sage, supra note 94 at 1749.
102 See Association of University Technology Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing Activity




104 See Jeff Gerth & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Drug Makers Reap Profits on Tax-Backed
Research” The New York Times (23 April 2000) at 1.1.
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However, critics have queried the propriety of using public money to fund a
profit-orientated industry whose products are often too expensive for the average
citizen.105 For instance, at an average cost of between $40 and $50 for a tiny bottle,
Xalatan was priced out of reach of low-income Americans who had no prescription
drug coverage.106 It has been observed that the distributions of the benefits of com-
mercialization of publicly funded research are skewed in favour of private compa-
nies and universities, and against the public interest.107 This is exemplified in the
United States where, despite the billions of public dollars poured annually into
pharmaceutical basic research via public research institutions,108 millions of mostly
uninsured seniors still stream across the border into Canada and Mexico for
cheaper prescription drugs.109
This has rekindled debates on whether it is appropriate that taxpayer-funded
pharmaceuticals are often beyond taxpayers’ purchasing power. According to Re-
becca Eisenberg, while there is a compelling case for granting patents exclusivity to
firms for privately funded research, allowing private firms to hold exclusive rights
to inventions that have been generated at public expense would be tantamount to
requiring the public to pay twice for the same invention.110 However, as Eisenberg
notes, advocates of “private appropriation” of publicly funded research are quick to
argue that further investments are necessary to refine, test, commercialize, and mar-
ket publicly funded inventions, and that the government lacks the expertise and
recourses for those activities.111 Nevertheless, even if private funds had to supple-
ment public money in getting a product refined and into the market, the pertinent
question is: should not taxpayers’ contributions to the underlying research and de-
velopment be factored into product pricing? In other words, should the pharmaceu-
tical industry account for public funding of the underlying basic research in pre-
105 See Bouchard, supra note 97 at 125-126.
106 A tiny bottle of Xalatan lasted six weeks, on average, and was sold for between $45
and $50, an average cost of $1 per day — one that Albert Russell, a retiree who had no
prescription drug coverage, could not afford. See Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 104 at
1.1.
107 See Bouchard, supra note 97 at 125-126.
108 See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, supra note 95 at 2 (notes
that the U.S. National Institutes of Health contributed $28.7 billion, $28.5 billion, and
$28.6 billion in 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively, to new drug development).
109 Most purchases are made via the internet. See John A. Vernon, Stephan Goupil, &
Joseph H. Colec, “The Internet and Pharmaceutical Importation: Economic Realities
and Other Related Issues” (2006) 16:3 Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology
at 545–564 (the authors note the findings of a Minority Staff Report of the U.S. House
of Representatives that “uninsured seniors in Maine pay 72 [per cent] more . . . than
individual purchasers in Canada, and 102 [per cent] more than individual purchasers in
Mexico”); Ibid. at 556; Jeremy W. Hochberg, “Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: Regulating
Internet Pharmacies” (2004) 37 Journal of Health Law at 445-446.
110 See Eisenberg, supra note 91 at 1663.
111 Ibid.
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scription drug pricing? It would seem equitable and fair for them to do so. How-
ever, it is most unlikely that they would do so voluntarily due to the lure of the
market, which is made all the more lucrative by a patents monopoly that guarantees
market exclusivity.112 It would certainly be in the public interest to make the phar-
maceutical industry accountable for underlying public funding via product pricing
if doing so would enhance affordability and bridge the access gap to prescription
drugs.113
It is significant that the propriety of the public’s paying twice for the products
of patented, yet publicly funded, research was examined in some detail but, the
inclusion of a recoupment provision was mooted in the run up to the passage of the
U.S. Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.114 However, a recoupment provision, which was ini-
tially included in the original Bayh Dole bill, was expunged before the bill was
signed into law.115 The issue however, came to a head in 1989, when most HIV-
positive individuals could not afford AZT, the most effective drug at the time.116
The resultant public outcry led to heated debates in the U.S. Congress on the pro-
priety of a pharmaceuticals price control and the adoption of a “reasonable price”
requirement by the NIH for inventions arising from the Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement.117 On 2 December 1992, the U.S. National Institutes of
Health convened an advisory meeting on the modality for ensuring that drugs de-
veloped with public funds were priced to reflect “public investment in the product,
and the health and safety needs of the public”.118Although the NIH could legally
look into the issue of whether drug pricing should reflect public investments under
the boilerplate provisions of the NIH-industry cooperative R&D agreements,119 the
112 See Richard G. Frank, “Prescription Drug Prices: Why Do Some Pay More Than
Others Do?” (2001) 20:2 Health Affairs at 115–128 (notes that brand-name drugs have
market power conferred upon them via the patent system). For instance, the Xalatan
patent is due to expire in 2011. This allows the Pharmacia Corporation to corner the
market for glaucoma drugs and charge monopoly prices until patent expiration. See
Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 104.
113 It is certainly in the public interest to have an affordable prescription drug regime. This
arguably explains why most countries regulate prescription drug prices.
114 See Bhaven N. Sampat, “Patenting and the US Academic Research in the 20th Cen-
tury: The World Before and After Bayh Dole Act” (2006) 35:6 Research Pol-
icy 772 at 777.
115 Ibid.
116 See Sage, supra note 94 at 1742.
117 Ibid.
118 See “NIH Drafting Interim Pricing Policy Statement for Congressional Hearings” F-D-
C Reports (7 December 1992) at 7-8, cited in F.M. Scherer, “Pricing, Profits, and Tech-
nological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry” (1993) 7:3 Journal of Economic
Perspectives at 108.
119 Ibid. at 108.
STRONG MEDICINE: PATENTS, MARKET, AND POLICY CHALLENGES   77
NIH was reluctant to assume a role in price control despite pressures from the U.S.
Congress to the contrary.120
It is submitted that a policy geared towards reflecting public investments in
prescription drug pricing is not a price control mechanism per se, as the United
States National Institutes of Health had feared.121 Rather, it is an equitable measure
that would take due account of taxpayers’ contribution to financing of the basic
research leading to useful prescription drugs. Critics of this proposition might argue
that it would amount to a double taxation on the pharmaceutical industry, which
would normally have paid licensing fees to universities and publicly funded re-
search institutions for access to patented basic research. Though a valid and credi-
ble argument, it is arguably weakened by the findings that revenues generated from
licensing fees by universities and publicly funded research institutions are often
comparatively paltry and disproportionately small relative to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry’s profits.122 This is again exemplified by Xalatan, the best selling eye drug
for Glaucoma.123While Columbia University reportedly received an estimated one-
off $20 million royalties fee from Pharmacia Corporation, a Swedish Pharmaceuti-
cal company to whom the research was licensed,124 Pharmacia Corporation report-
edly earned an estimated $507 million (mostly pure profits) in annual sales of
Xalatan.125
Moreover, even if adequate royalties or licensing fees were paid by the phar-
maceutical industry for the use of patented publicly funded research, the real social
value of life-saving drugs that originated from publicly funded research is unquan-
tifiable, and cannot arguably be fully accounted for by licensing fees. In this view,
120 Ibid. at 108; Christopher Anderson, “Government-Industry Collaboration: NIH Panel
Rejects Pricing Clause” (1994) 265:5172 Science at 598 (reports on the NIH Panel’s
rejection of government participation in the pricing of products developed from gov-
ernment-private funded research). Significantly, the recoupment issue would not go
away and it resurfaced again in 2001, fueled by public concerns over whether taxpay-
ers’ interests were being adequately taken care of. The NIH, nevertheless, rejected re-
coupment on grounds that it would undermine medical research, reduce funds for aca-
demic development, discourage faculty members from engaging in technology transfer,
and interfere with industry agreements with academic institutions. See Bouchard, supra
note 97 at 175.
121 See F. M. Scherer, “Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical
Industry” (1993) 7:3 Journal of Economic Perspectives at 97.
122 See Campbell, supra note 93 at 70-71 (notes that, of the total $1.7 billion in licensing
revenues earned by the 140 respondents to the 1999-2000 annual survey of the Associ-
ation of University Technology Managers (AUTM), the top ten income producing uni-
versities generated $1 billion, or 60 per cent of all licensing revenues, and that the bulk
of the top ten’s licensing revenues derived from a small band of highly lucrative li-
censes); Ibid.
123 See Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 104.
124 Pharmacia Corporation merged with Monsanto in 2000. See ibid.
125 Most of the $507 earnings were said to be pure profits, as it costs pennies to make
latanaprost — the key ingredient of the compound used in making Xalatan; Ibid.
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the society could rightfully claim a “social lien” on drugs emanating from publicly
funded research.126
The pertinent consideration, therefore, is how best to account for the public
money invested in pharmaceutical research and development. The most practical
and cost-effective solution would appear to be the inclusion of recoupment provi-
sions in licensing agreements for publicly funded patented research that is trans-
ferred to the pharmaceutical industry.127 It has been suggested that technological
transfer laws such as the Bayh-Dole Act should be reassessed to accommodate such
recoupment provisions.128 This would allow the government to recoup public
money spent on developing pharmaceutical products. However, the recoupment
proposal is beset with an inherent weakness: the possibility that authorities might
not be able to recoup any more than the actual value of public investments in a
successful pharmaceutical product. Consequently, the money recouped could be so
disproportionately small to industry profits, or diminished by inflation, that it
would make little or no difference when ploughed back into the pool of funds dedi-
cated to subsidising prescription drug purchases.
This obstacle could be overcome if the government’s recoupment right is ex-
pressly coupled with other entitlements, as might be agreed upon by the parties in
the licensing contracts. These would range from royalty payments to, and or stock
options for the research institution concerned, or the government. The vesting of
right or entitlement to a percentage of accruable profits from product sales in the
government or the research institution concerned is also an option. Alternatively,
the inherent weakness in recoupment rights could, however, be overcome by gener-
ally levying “a compulsory government royalty” on publicly funded, successful
commercial products.129 A compulsory government royalty could be legally,
broadly and flexibly interpreted to exceed the original research grant, while taking
into account variables such as inflation, the product’s commercial success, accru-
able profits from the product’s sales, etc. Accruable revenues from the said com-
pulsory government royalty could then be ploughed back into funds dedicated to
subsidising prescription drug coverage.130 However, institutionalizing the measure
would require a regulatory framework akin to the one enacted by the state of
California.
126 In this context, “social lien” is not analogous to a lien, and it is not intended to import
its legal meaning. Rather, “social lien” is used to invoke societal moral claim to
pharmaceuticals from publicly funded research. The pharmaceutical industry would be
morally obliged to reciprocate the claim by easing access to drugs funded with public
money.
127 See Sage, supra note 94 at 1737–1752.
128 Ibid. at 1751.
129 Bouchard, supra note 97 at 173–188.
130 Ibid. at 173. Bouchard believes that the measure would operate “to balance public and
private interests in the privatisation of innovative research and thus ensures taxpayers’
interests in securing an appropriate return on federally funded research are protected.”
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(c)  Public Private Partnerships: The California Regenerative Medicine
Research Policy Model
The state of California is bucking the national stem cell policy trends.131 Cali-
fornia is not only funding stem cell research, contrary to the federal stem cell pol-
icy, but has come up with a unique intellectual property policy for recouping its
funding, and spreading the benefits of regenerative medicine amongst its citizens.
The policy is thus radically different from the national intellectual property policy
on federally-funded research that was analyzed in the preceding paragraph.132
In early 2005, the state of California established the California Institute for
Regenerative Medicine (CIRM).133 The CIRM was empowered to make grants and
provide loans for stem cell research.134 In February 2008, the CIRM published its
intellectual property policy to govern the ownership of patents arising from CIRM-
funded research135 and revenue sharing modalities between the state of California
and for-profit organizations researching stem cells.136 According to the policy, for-
profit grantees must annually report to CIRP and have all patents applications filed,
including any licensing agreements relating to any inventions arising from CIRM-
funded research, and accruable revenues from licensing agreements.137
It is also required of a for-profit grantee to submit a plan to the CIRM outlin-
ing how uninsured Californians would access a drug produced wholly or partly
from CIRM-funded Research.138 Significantly, the drug must be sold at a price
131 The Bush administration is reluctant to use federal money to fund stem cell research on
ethical and religious grounds. The federal government’s policy is premised on grounds
that the research would harm embryos. See Charles Babington, “Stem Cell Bill Gets
Bush’s First Veto” The Washington Post (20 July 2006) at A04 (comments on Presi-
dent Bush’s veto of U.S. Congress’s bill to lift funding restrictions on human embry-
onic stem cell research. President Bush is opposed to stem cell research on ethical
grounds).
132 See para. B, above.
133 CIRM was established in 2005 through the passage of Proposition 71, the California
Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative. The statewide ballot measure was approved
by voters on 2 November 2004. It provided $3 billion in funding for stem cell research
at California universities and research institutions. See, online: California Institute for
Regenerative Medicine (CIRM) <http://www.cirm.ca.gov/>.
134 Ibid.
135 CIRM-funded patented invention is defined as “An invention that has been patented
under Title 35 of the United States Code, and that resulted wholly or in part from
CIRM-funded Research, except in the event the patent has expired, been abandoned or
found to be invalid or otherwise unenforceable (unless noted otherwise in these regula-
tions).” See c. 4, s. 100401(b), 17 California Code of Regs. Intellectual Property and
Revenue Sharing Requirements for For-Profit Organizations, online:
<http://www.cirm.ca.gov/faq/pdf/ForProfitOrg.pdf>.
136 Ibid. at ss. 100400–100410.
137 Ibid. at s. 100402 (a)(d)(e).
138 Ibid. at s. 100407(a).
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provided for under the California Discount Prescription Drug Program.139 This
provision arguably, clearly borders on price control, and most probably explains
why it is followed up by the following caveat:
This regulation is not intended, and this regulation shall not be construed, to
preempt or prevent any other requirement under state or federal law or regu-
lation, or agreement or contract, that would result in selling a Drug at a
lower price than provided hereunder.140
Ostensibly, the caveat is aimed at deflecting the perception that the statute
could preempt federal patent law and allied legislations. Under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution, only Congress could regulate inter-
national and interstate commerce.141 Thus, states are implicitly prohibited from
passing legislation that could affect interstate commerce, or impinge on Congress’s
authority to regulate interstate commerce within the federation.142 It remains to be
seen how well the California law regulating the price of CIRM-sponsored drugs
can hold out under the scrutiny of the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.143
There are, without doubt, conceivable scenarios for the possible invocation of
the commerce clause against the CIRM-sponsored drug price control policy. For
instance, if there was evidence that the California price control policy interfered
with Congress’s authority to regulate prescription drug prices, or that the California
measure was depressing prescription drug prices in other states, or making pharma-
ceutical firms in other states less competitive, or interfering with the way their busi-
nesses were run under the laws of their respective states, or that the policy was
weakening the pharmaceutical patents monopoly conferred by Congress via the
Patents Act of 1976, then there could be a valid constitutional ground for challeng-
ing the policy.
139 Ibid. at s. 100407(b)(c).
140 Ibid. at s. 100407(d).
141 See Unites States Constitution Art. 1, s. 8, cl. 3.
142 See for example, Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (U.S. Conn., 1989). The
U.S. Supreme Court struck down provisions of a Connecticut statute that required out-
of-state shippers of beer to affirm that their posted prices for products sold to Connecti-
cut wholesalers were no higher than the prices at which those products were sold in
States bordering Connecticut. The Healy Court found that Connecticut’s price affirma-
tion statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminated against
brewers and shippers of beer engaged in interstate commerce, and directly controlled
commerce occurring wholly outside the state of Connecticut. Healy, ibid. at 491.
143 Generally, whether or not a state statute would be held violative of the dormant com-
merce clause, and therefore unconstitutional, would depend on the facts of each case.
For a discussion, see Taiwo A. Oriola, “Regulating Unsolicited Commercial Electronic
Mail in the United States and the European Union: Challenges and Prospects” (2005) 7
Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property 113 at 134–140 (extensively re-
views the case law on the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution.)
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These scenarios are exemplified by the analogous District of Columbia’s Pre-
scription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005.144 The Act prohibited any patented
drug from being sold in the District of Columbia for an excessive price.145 How-
ever, the Act was successfully challenged in 2005 before the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia by the Biotechnology Industry Organization and
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.146 The Federal Dis-
trict Court held, inter alia, that the statute preempted pharmaceuticals monopoly
rights vested in the Federal patent law.147 In a subsequent appeal by the District of
Columbia to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Court of Ap-
peals, by its decision of August 2007, affirmed the judgment of the Federal District
Court on grounds, inter alia, that the Prescription Drug Excessive Price Act was
preempted by the Federal patent law.148
However, whether or not a state law purporting to regulate prescription drug
prices, would preempt federal law, would depend on the factual circumstances un-
derpinning the statute in question. This is exemplified by the case of
Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of America v. Walsh,149 where the U.S. Su-
preme Court affirmed a Court of Appeals decision, allowing for the implementation
of the state of Maine’s Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for Prescription Drugs.150
Maine had sought to use the statute to extract a discount on prescription drugs pur-
chased on the Medicaid program.151 Maine intended to use savings from the dis-
count to fund its uninsured residents.152 Drug manufacturers who did not co-oper-
ate risked having their products made available to the recipients of Maine Medicaid
on prior authorization with a consequentially potential loss in market share for the
recalcitrant manufacturers.153 The U.S. Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the
Maine statute did not interfere with interstate commerce, and was therefore consti-
144 See the District of Columbia Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005, codified
at D.C. Code ss. 28-4555.
145 The operative section of the Act provides that “It shall be unlawful for any manufac-
turer or licensee thereof, excluding a point of sale retail seller, to sell or supply for sale
or impose minimum resale requirements for a patented prescription drug that results in
the prescription drug being sold in the District for an excessive price”. See D.C. Code,
ss. 28-4553, ibid.
146 See also Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of America v. District of Columbia, 406
F.Supp.2d 56 (D.D.C., 2005) [Pharm. Research].
147 Patents monopoly rights necessarily include the right to dictate the price of patented
products; Ibid.
148 See Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343
(C.A.Fed. (Dist.Col.), 2007) [Biotechnology].




153 Ibid. at 1863-64.
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tutional.154 The Court found further that Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers
did not prove that the Maine program impinged on the Medicaid statute by impos-
ing a state requirement devoid of a “Medicaid purpose.”155
It is interesting that Maine was allowed to extract compulsory discounts from
drug manufacturers, while the District of Columbia was denied the right to cap
prescription drug prices. Although clearly distinguishable, Maine and District of
Columbia statutes arguably had a similar objective: to reduce the cost of prescrip-
tion drugs purchased in their respective states. Thus, the cases underscore the view
that the preemption doctrine operates on the nature and factual circumstances of
each statute. A fortiori, it is conceivable that CIRM price control policy for spon-
sored prescription drugs might escape the preemption trap. This is especially so
because it is specific to CIRM-sponsored prescription drugs, rather than prescrip-
tion drugs generally, or prescription drugs sponsored with equity funds, as the
terms of the District of Columbia legislation ostensibly provided for.156
Furthermore, for-profit grantees, who had subscribed to price control terms at
the time of award from CIRM funds, might not be able to renege on their agree-
ment, as they would be legally obliged to abide by the terms of their contract. It is
trite that valid contractual obligations acquiescing to diminished rights, or waivers
thereof, would trump subsequent claims to untrammeled intellectual property
rights.157
Another key provision of the CIRM intellectual property policy is a revenue
sharing formula between the state of California and for-profit grantees.158 A
grantee must share with the state of California a fraction of any ‘Net Licensing
Revenue’ it receives under a license agreement for a CIRM-funded patented inven-
tion.159 ‘Net Licensing Revenue’ is defined as “[g]ross revenue derived from a li-
cense agreement minus the direct costs incurred in the prosecution and protection
of a CIRM-funded patented invention.”160 A for-profit grantee is obliged to pay 25
per cent of Net Licensing Revenue in excess of $500,000 to the state of California
for deposit in the state’s general fund.161 The threshold amount of $500,000 shall
be adjusted annually by a multiple of a fraction, the denominator of which is, inter
alia, the Consumer Price Index.162 Furthermore, if there were other sources of
funding for the development of a CIRM-funded patented invention, then the return
154 Ibid. at 1870-71.
155 Ibid. at 1867–70.
156 See supra note 144.
157 For example, a European patent is an object of property, and may be assigned, licensed,
or contracted out under terms agreeable to the parties concerned. See Articles 71, 72,
73, and 74 of the European Patent Convention, October 5, 1973, (as amended).
158 See supra note 135 at section 100408.
159 See ibid. at s. 100408(a).
160 See ibid. at s. 100401(m).
161 See ibid. at s. 100408(a)(1).
162 See ibid.
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to the state of California on Net Licensing Revenue in excess of $500,000 shall be
calculated by dividing CIRM grants to the patented invention by the totality of all
funding provided from all sources — that fraction shall be multiplied by 25.163 The
resultant numeral shall be the percentage of Net Licensing Revenue due to the state
of California.164
Additionally, a for-profit grantee must share with the state of California a frac-
tion of any “Net Commercial Revenue” it receives from a self-commercialized
product resulting from its CIRM-funded research.165 Net Commercial Revenue is
defined as “income from commercial sales of a product(s) resulting from CIRM-
funded research. . . .”166 Net Commercial Revenue is designed as a payback of the
original CIRM grants in the form of a royalty. A grantee must pay royalties to the
state of California on Net Commercial Revenue exceeding the threshold amount of
$500,000.167 However, total payments shall not exceed three times the total amount
of the CIRM grants.168 The precise rate of payback in the form of a royalty shall be
negotiated between the grantee and the CIRM, but it shall not be less than two per
cent or more than five per cent of the annual Net Commercial Revenue from the
invention, unless the product achieves a blockbuster status.169
Moreover, if the invention was a blockbuster, and the accruable Net Commer-
cial Revenue exceeded the milestones of $250 million and $500 million per year,
then upon the occurrence of each of these milestones, the grantee should pay to the
state of California a one-time blockbuster payment of three times the total amount
of the grant.170 However, in addition to any other amount due under the regulation,
where a CIRM-funded patented invention fetched Net Commercial Revenue in ex-
cess of $500 million in a year, and where CIRM funds of up to $5 million were
made in support of the said invention, then the grantee would pay the state of Cali-
fornia one per cent of Net Commercial Revenue in excess of $500 million for the
life of the patent.171
Thus, the California law not only ensures that all grants in support of patented
inventions or research are recouped, but also lays claims to a percentage of net
163 See ibid. at s. 100408(a)(2).
164 Ibid.
165 See ibid. at s. 100408(b).
166 “Net Commercial Revenue excludes the following (as they pertain to the making, using
or selling of products resulting from CIRM-funded research): (1) import, export, excise
and sales taxes, and customs duties; (2) costs of insurance, packing, and transportation
from the place of manufacture to the customer’s premises; (3) credit for returns, al-
lowances or trades; and (4) pre-commercial revenues received in connection with re-
search and development and/or clinical activities.” See ibid. at section 100401 (n).
167 See ibid. at s. 100408(b)(1).
168 See ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 See ibid. at s. 100408(b)(2).
171 See ibid. at s. 100408(b)(3).
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licensing revenues and net commercial revenues while adjusting for inflation and
accruable profits.
Additionally, it caps the price at which California-sponsored pharmaceuticals
could be sold to Californian citizens. Moreover, grantees have an obligation to
draw up a workable modality for facilitating access to California-sponsored pre-
scription drugs by uninsured Californians. The law unequivocally represents a new
era of responsible and equitable public private partnerships, and it is highly recom-
mended to governments around the world. However, it remains to be seen whether
for-profit grantees would find the underlying contractual obligations attractive or
repugnant, or whether the pharmaceutical industry would challenge the law on
grounds ranging from preemption to restraints of trade.
II. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
COSTS: A CONUNDRUM
New drug development is, globally, an expensive and research intensive busi-
ness.172 For example, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry reputedly spent $43 billion
on pharmaceutical research and development in 2006.173 Moreover, a study pub-
lished in 2003 by the Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development, estimated
the costs of manufacturing a new drug at $802 million (2002 U.S. dollars).174 Ac-
cording to Light D. W. et al., these estimates have been widely cited and accepted
as an authoritative fact by the highest national and international policy circles.175
However, the real costs of manufacturing new drugs are as elusive as they are po-
lemical, the Tufts Study notwithstanding.
Notably, the methodology used, and the validity and accuracy of the data that
underpin the Tufts Study has been challenged.176 The Tufts Study has been espe-
cially criticized for inflating or overestimating the costs of developing a new drug,
by the inclusion of “capitalized” or opportunity costs (the revenue that would have
been generated over the period of development, had the out-of-pocket expenses
been invested in the equity market), and the failure to account for tax breaks and
172 Pharmaceutical R&D is said to be one of the most research intensive and expensive
businesses in the U.S. See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,
supra note 95 at 2.
173 Ibid. at 2-3.
174 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, “The Price of Innova-
tion: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs” (2003) 22 Journal of Health Eco-
nomics at 151–185.
175 Donald W. Light & Rebecca N. Warburton, “Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordi-
nary Evidence” (2005) 24 Journal of Health Economics at 1030-1033. The figures are
also cited in the 2007 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America’s Pro-
file, supra note 95 at 5.
176 W. Light & N. Warburton, ibid.
STRONG MEDICINE: PATENTS, MARKET, AND POLICY CHALLENGES   85
government subsidies.177 However, despite the Tufts Study’s apparent flaws and
incompleteness, the inclusion of the “opportunity costs” accruable during the
lengthy period of new drug development has been defended as a standard account-
ing practice.178 It has also been argued that although tax relief could provide finan-
cial advantage to a drug developer, it would not alter the estimates of the out-of-
pocket costs.179
It is submitted, however, that any estimates that discount tax relief, or add
bogus opportunity costs to the cost of developing a new drug would be grossly
inaccurate. Ascertaining the exact costs of pharmaceuticals R&D, absent public
funding, tax-breaks, government subsidies, advertising expenditures, etc., is in the
public interest. Accurate estimates are also crucial for an objective evaluation and
rationalization of the spiraling prescription drug prices, which are often justified by
high R&D costs.180 However, ascertaining the real costs of new drugs absent gov-
ernment subsidies and tax breaks, etc., is notoriously problematic as the pharma-
ceutical industry is generally reluctant to “comment on gross margins on individual
products”.181
Alarmed by the increasingly high costs of prescription drugs in the U.S., crit-
ics have charged that R&D costs actually had no link to the relatively high costs of
prescription drugs.182 According to Uwe Reinhardt, a University of Princeton eco-
nomics Professor, the price of drugs “has nothing to do with cost of research. It’s
whatever the drug companies can get. If they have a drug for which there is really
no good alternative that is what they will hit with high prices.”183 As such, critics
maintain that the pharmaceutical industry’s profits are too excessive and that it
could make prescription drugs affordable by slashing prices.184
However, while the real cost of developing a new drug is polemical, it is cer-
tainly not cheap, and there appears to be a general consensus that high R&D costs
may be partly responsible for the spiraling prescription drug prices.185 The perti-
177 Frank Clemente et al., “America’s Other Drug Problem: A Briefing Book on the Rx
Drug Debate” Public Citizen (2002) at 46–48, online: Public Citizen
<http://www.citizen.org/documents/drugbriefingbk.pdf>.
178 Rawlins, supra note 17 at 360–364 (the author, while noting the study’s incomplete-
ness, reluctantly accepts the $802 million Tufts figures for manufacturing a new drug).
179 Ibid. at 360.
180 Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 104.
181 When asked about Xalatan’s gross-profit margin, Dr. Anders Harfstrand, the then vice
president for ophthalmology at Pharmacia Corporation, reportedly said: “We never
comment on gross margins on individual products”. Ibid. However, the information he
declined to offer was crucial to ascertaining approximate costs of R&D, clinical trials,
tax breaks, and government subsidies for Xalatan.
182 Clemente, supra note 177 at 40–48.
183 Cited in Hawthorne, supra note 1 at 176.
184 Ibid. at 176.
185 Rawlins, supra note 17 at 360–364 (notes that extensive clinical trials and attendant
regulatory hurdles were responsible for the high costs of developing new drugs).
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nent question, therefore, is: can anything be done to mitigate the spiraling costs of
pharmaceutical research and development? A string of commingled legal and
socio-economic externalities governing pre and post research and development
phases have been implicated in the steep research and development costs and con-
sequential run-away prescription drug prices.186 They range from the legally re-
quired extensive and expensive pre-clinical and clinical trials and the delay in the
review and approval process for new drugs, to the huge costs of advertising and
marketing.187 The following paragraphs will critically review the literature on these
externalities in relative detail, and discuss how they could best be managed to miti-
gate the costs of developing new drugs and curb the run-away prescription drug
prices. Certainly, the reduction of pharmaceutical products’ development costs is
imperative to achieving the goal of affordable and accessible drugs.188
(a) Clinical Trials and the New Drug Approval Process: Analysis of
Impacts on Drug Development Overheads
Pharmaceuticals are arguably one of the most regulated consumables.189 Drug
safety and efficacy imperatives are the arrow-heads of the drug regulatory re-
gime.190 However, drug regulation is said to contribute to delays in drug approval
and market debut, and in that context, it comes at a price that is ultimately paid by
consumers.191
The regulation with the most direct impact on drug development is, perhaps,
the one on mandatory pre-clinical and clinical trials.192 In the U.S., as in Europe,
pre-clinical and clinical trials are legally mandated by law193 and are often drawn
out over a period of years — this considerably adds to the costs of drug develop-
186 Ibid. at 361–363 (notes how the extensive pre-clinical and clinical trials are upping the
costs of new drug discovery).
187 Ibid.; Frank Clemente et al., supra note 177 at 27–29 (notes the impact of advertising
expenditures, amongst other factors, on prescription drug prices).
188 World Health Organization, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
Innovation and Public Health, Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property
Rights (Geneva: WHO Press, 2006) at 18 (notes the imperatives of rethinking the strat-
egies for pharmaceutical product cost reduction to ensure drug availability and af-
fordability in developing countries).
189 Santoro, supra note 17 at 15.
190 Agrawal, supra note 34 at 5 (notes that the Thalidomite disaster was the catalyst for
tighter regulatory reforms in the pharmaceutical industry in the U.S.).
191 Ibid. (notes that tighter regulatory reforms have made pharmaceutical research more
expensive and time-consuming); Rawlins, supra note 17 at 362 (notes that the regula-
tory policies on the quality and quantity of data required for drug approval do deter-
mine the size of a clinical program).
192 Ibid.
193 Carl C. Peck, Donald B. Rubin, & Lewis B. Sheiner, “Hypothesis: A Single Clinical
Trial Plus Causal Evidence of Effectiveness is Sufficient for Drug Approval” (2003)
73:6 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics at 481–490.
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ment.194 Pre-clinical and clinical trials are integral elements of the drug approval
process and occur in three phases.195 Phase one studies compare the pharmacologi-
cal effects in animal experimentation with those expressed in human subjects, and
seek to provide crucial information on dosage regimen.196 Phase two studies gener-
ally seek to establish the amount of dosage required to achieve a new drug’s antici-
pated therapeutic benefits and to provide preliminary evidence of its safety for
human use.197 Phase three studies generally seek to confirm a new drug’s therapeu-
tic efficacy and safety in a wider patient population at the dosage proposed for
marketing and could include studies of comparative efficacy.198 Thus, the conven-
tional clinical trials are evidence based, providing the needed assurance of drug
efficacy and safety to regulators and the public.199
However, conventional clinical trials are equally expansive and invariably ex-
pensive,200 leading to suggestions that alternatives should be explored if costs are
to be minimized.201 One of the proposals for cutting costs without prejudice to drug
safety and efficacy suggests a reduction in the time taken to conduct clinical studies
and a reduction in the number of patients enrolled for pre-marketing clinical tri-
als.202 Invariably, authorities seeking to cut time and the number of patients in
clinical programs would have to balance the cost effectiveness of reduced clinical
programs vis-à-vis the socio-economic and legal imperatives of drug safety and
efficacy.203 Obviously, drug safety and effectiveness are paramount, and it would
be ludicrous to sacrifice that for short term costs savings. Moreover, rushing new
drugs through clinical trials could potentially compromise the rights of human re-
194 Crowley Jr., supra note 17 at 174-175.





200 Santoro, supra note 17 at 15 (noting that drugs are more expensive because of long and
large clinical trials).
201 Rawlins, supra note 17 at 362.
202 Ibid.; Peck, Rubin & Sheiner, supra note 193 at 481–490 (notes that multiple clinical
trials could be reduced into one without compromising safety and efficacy).
203 For instance, a recent analysis of 25 anti-cancer drug trials, over a period of eleven
years, showed that a drug’s early release into the market could be affecting its efficacy.
The study also suggested that, although stopping the trials early could be beneficial to
patients who would have early access, it appeared that shorter trials were motivated by
the industry’s commercial interests rather than the patients’ interests. See F. Trotta, G.
Apolone, S. Garattini & G. Tafuri, “Stopping a Trial Early in Oncology: For Patients or
for Industry?” (August 2008) 19 Annals of Oncology at 1512–1513.
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search subjects. This is especially so following high-profile drug mishaps ranging
from the thalidomide disaster,204 to the more recent Vioxx debacle.205
Another possible means to cost reduction is to expedite the new drug review
and approval process. In the U.S. for example, the Federal Food and Drug Agency
is statutorily obliged to review new drug applications within 180 days from the
time of submission.206 However, it often takes the FDA over three times the statu-
tory limit to approve a new drug for the market due to work overload and related
logistics problems.207 On the whole, the process of rigorous and painstaking pre-
clinical and clinical trials that precede marketing approval for a new drug means
that it takes an average of twelve years to progress from the commencement of a
new drug’s development to FDA approval in the U.S.208
However, while pre-clinical and clinical trial processes cannot be compro-
mised, a new drug review and approval process could certainly be expedited in
order to cut patients’ waiting time for crucial prescription drugs. In the U.S., for
example, two major obstacles to an expedited new drug review and approval pro-
cess have been identified. The first is the dearth of resources along with concomi-
tant work overload for FDA personnel, creating huge backlog of new drug applica-
tions.209 The second is the FDA’s desire to safeguard its reputation for protecting
the public’s health, and secure its organizational legitimacy;210 it is perceived that
every time the FDA approves a new drug, it takes a chance with its reputation due
to the inherent uncertainty in the new drug review process.211 Under the circum-
stances, the FDA is liable to make two types of errors: approving a bad drug, or
failing to approve an effective and safe drug that should be approved.212 Cutting
204 Agrawal, supra note 34 at 5. Thalidomide was developed as a sedative and anti-anxiety
medication. No teratogenicity studies were carried out before its release in Europe in
1957 and, at the time, it was widely prescribed during pregnancy. By the time McBride
& Lenz published the drug’s side effects in The Lancet in 1961, more than 10,000
infants had been born with deformities; See “The Thalidomide Disaster”, online:
<http://www.obgyn.nus.edu.sg/maxdata1/The%20thalidomide%20disaster.htm>.
205 Santoro, supra note 17 at 13–16 (details the safety fears that led to Merck’s 2004 with-
drawal of Vioxx, its best selling pain inhibitor that was used by over 20 million people
worldwide, from the market. There was evidence linking Vioxx to heart attack and
stroke risks).
206 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, supra note 18 at 12.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid. at 6 (notes that U.S. patients often had to wait for twelve years, on average, for the
approval of a new drug, and that many drugs had to be approved abroad before becom-
ing available to U.S. patients).
209 Ibid. at 12.
210 Daniel P. Carpenter, “The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Polit-
ics, and Lessons for Policy” (2004) 23:1 Health Affairs at 52–63.
211 Ibid. at 55 (the author notes that the most successful clinical trials could not eliminate
the possibility that a new drug might turn out to be unsafe or inefficacious).
212 Ibid.
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drug approval times is a possible solution to delays in the new drug review and
approval process, but one that could likely come at a higher marginal cost.213 Out-
sourcing of a new drug review to a third party or the privatization of a new drug
approval process has also been floated as a possible solution.214
In 2005, The European Medicines Agency resolved to grant conditional ap-
provals and shorten the scientific review of new drugs to 150 days.215 Similarly,
through the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, the U.S. aimed to expedite
the FDA’s new drug review and approval process in mandating that payment of
fees by pharmaceutical companies filing for new drug applications be made to the
FDA.216 Prior to the enactment of the Act, on average, it took the FDA thrice the
statutory 180 days to review new drug application for the market, due to their huge
backlog and workload.217 Fees paid to the FDA under the Act are dedicated to
boosting its resources and expediting the review of new drug applications.218 Early
market entry of new drugs could provide the crucial competition needed to reduc-
ing prices of drugs of comparative therapeutic values and clinical benefits. How-
ever, a crucial balancing act would have to be exercised on a case by case basis.
Drug safety and efficacy is paramount and should not be sacrificed in favour of
early market debut.
(b) Advertising Expenditures: Impacts on Prescription Drug Pricing
The second potential contributor to prescription drug expenditures and conse-
quential high prices is the huge cost of prescription drug promotion and advertis-
ing.219 Unlike clinical trials and the drug approval process, which offer little wiggle
room, advertising expenditures can arguably be managed and contained.
There are two types of advertising: the first is professional spending, which
includes marketing and promotion aimed at doctors, and the second is direct-to-
213 Ibid. at 60.
214 Ibid. at 61.
215 The European Medicines Agency, The European Medicines Agency Road Map to
2010: Preparing the Ground for the Future. Doc. EMEA/H/34163/03/Final (4 March
2005) at 36–45, online: European Medicines Agency
<http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/general/direct/directory/3416303enF.pdf>.
216 See S.R. Shulman & K.I. Kaitin, “The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992: A 5-
Year Experiment for Industry and the FDA” (1996) 9:2 Pharmacoeconomics at
121–133.
217 See Pharmaceutical Association of America, supra note 18 at 12. Congress
reauthorized FDA to continue to charge drug manufacturers fees for new drug applica-
tions in September 2007. The re-authorization was done via The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act as amended by the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 2007
(FDAAA) (PDUFA IV). See 72 Fed. Reg. 58103 (2007).
218 See Shulman & Kaitin, supra note 216 at 121–133.
219 See Thomas Abrams, “The Regulation of Prescription Drug Promotion” in Michael A.
Santoro and Thomas M. Gorrie, eds., Ethics and the Pharmaceutical Industry (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 15.
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consumer (DTC) advertising.220 Drug advertising expenditures are usually hefty.
For instance, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America spent an
estimated $7 billion and $5 billion respectively on professional and direct-to-con-
sumer advertising in the United States in 2006.221 However, these figures would
appear modest relative to what used to be the norm.222 While this might be evi-
dence that the industry’s recently avowed self-censorship is working,223 it is argua-
bly too steep for the indispensable public goods that prescription drugs are.
While the costs of professional advertising, which targets physicians is, within
reason, generally more acceptable,224 DTC advertising has drawn the most criti-
cism.225 Notably, only the U.S. and New Zealand allow DTC advertising in the
industrialized world.226 In the U.S., the surge in DTC advertising has been mainly
220 See Matthews, supra note 19 at 16.
221 See Pharmaceutical Association of America, supra note 18 at 13.
222 According to Frank Davidoff, in 1999, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry spent $13.9
billion on promotion alone, $2 billion on direct-to-consumer advertising, over $7 bil-
lion in free drug samples, and $80 million per year on lobbying. See Frank Davidoff,
“The Heartbreak of Drug Pricing” (2001) 134:11 Annals of Internal Medicine at
1068–1070.
223 In 2005, the U.S. Pharmaceutical Association’s Board of Directors unanimously ap-
proved the establishment of the “Guiding Principles” to govern DTC advertisements.
The new principles, which became effective in 2006, directed the industry to create an
Office of Accountability to accept comments from the public regarding DTC advise-
ments, and to appoint an independent Review Panel. See Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, supra note 18 at 19; See however Kurt C. Stange’s view
that the industry’s self-censorship and FDA oversight were not working. See Kurt C.
Stange, “Time to Ban Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Marketing” (2007) 5:2
Annals of Family Medicine at 101–104.
224 For example, paragraph 47 to the preamble to Directive 2001/83/EC of the European
Parliament and the Council, on the Community code relating to medicinal products for
human use, (as amended) allows for professional advertising targeting physicians sub-
ject to strict conditions and effective monitoring. See OJL 311, 28/11/2001 P. 0067-
0128. Para. 48, id., provides that monitoring mechanisms shall be in accordance with
the provisions of Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising OJL 250,
19/9/1984, at 17–20.
225 Stange, supra note 223 at 101–104 (canvasses for a ban on DTC in order to protect
public health and the quality of health care). Some of the most articulated objections to
DTC are its propensity to shift the physician’s prescription responsibility to the con-
sumer and mounting evidence that it is detracting from the clinical quality of care; See
W. David Bradford et al., “How Direct-To-Consumer Television Advertising for Os-
teoarthritis Drugs Affects Physicians’ Prescribing Behavior” (2006) 25:5 Health Af-
fairs at 1371–1377; Michael S. Wilkes, Robert A. Bell, & Richard L. Kravitz, “Direct-
to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, and Implications” (2000)
19:2 Health Affairs at 110–128.
226 Erin J. Asher, “Lessons Learned From New Zealand: Pro-Active Industry Shift towards
Self-Regulation of Direct-To-Consumer Advertising Will Improve Compliance with
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attributed to generous health insurance benefits, which transfer the burden of pay-
ing for prescription drugs to insurers.227 However, the literature on the effects of
DTC advertising on prescription drug pricing is far from unanimous. While Merrill
Matthews contends that there is no nexus between DTC advertising and rising drug
prices,228 Michael S. Wilkes et al., posit that DTC could indeed increase drug costs
to the consumer in the absence of competition, or decrease drug prices by promot-
ing competition, if there were competing drugs on the market.229
However, if we accepted DTC expenditures as part of prescription drug over-
heads, it is inconceivable that these expenditures would not get passed on to the
consumers through pricing. It is rational economic behaviour of for-profit firms to
pass on overhead costs to consumers through product pricing, and there is no basis
for exempting pharmaceutical firms from such a natural trajectory induced by mar-
ket dynamics. Even then, advertising that is not DTC is as likely to increase drug
pricing as is DTC advertising.230 It has been posited that the pharmaceutical indus-
try is by nature advertising intensive, and that advertising is an inherent competitive
market structure determinant tool.231 According to Catherine Matraves, as pharma-
ceutical firms’ market shares increase, there is an intuitive incentive to gain market
share through escalation of advertising and, or research and development expendi-
tures, with a corresponding rise in overhead costs and an increase in the degree of
economies of scale.232 A fortiori, even in nations in which DTC advertising does
not occur, professional or physician-directed advertising remains an integral feature
of prescription drug economics due to its apparent indispensability to shaping the
pharmaceuticals market share for competitors.233
The pertinent question therefore is: should authorities cap advertising expendi-
tures? For a start, the U.S. would do well to scrap DTC advertising as most indus-
trialized countries have done. I find it inconceivable that DTC advertising expendi-
ture would not escalate prescription drug overheads and aggravate prescription
drug costs. As for professional advertising, it should certainly be capped if there
was irrefutable evidence that it contributed to prescription drug prices. Arguably,
such evidence is not hard to find at all; it is apparent in the $7 billion 2006 figures,
which comprised approximately 16 per cent of the $43 billion spent on research
the FDA” (2006) 16:3 Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology at 599–627;
Stange, supra note 223 at 102.
227 Matthews, supra note 19 at 2.
228 Ibid. at 16.
229 Wilkes, Bell & Kravitz, supra note 225 at 122.
230 Matraves, supra note 18 at 169–194.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.; However, see also the countervailing argument that advertising did not increase
prescription drug price in any discernible way, in Merrill Matthews, “Who’s Afraid of
Pharmaceutical Advertising? A Response to a Changing Health Care System” supra
note 19 at 6–9.
233 Matraves, supra note 18 at 169–194.
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and development in the U.S. If the $5 billion spent on DTC advertising is thrown
into the bill, it would raise the total advertising expenditures to approximately 28
per cent of the 2006 R&D budget. While capping professional advertising expendi-
tures could raise free speech issues, such narrow concerns should arguably be
trumped by the overarching public interest. After all, there is no absolute right as
such, as evidenced by the limits placed on property rights by eminent domain rules
in the United States.234
(c) The Propriety of Prescription Drug Price Regulation
Spiraling prices increasingly make prescription drugs an object of regulatory
concern in both developed and developing countries.235 Drug prices are generally
higher in the U.S. than in other countries, which is partly due to the absence of a
price control regime.236 For instance, in 2003 a month’s supply of the antidepres-
sant, Zoloft, retailed for $82 in the U.S., but sold for $42 and $29 respectively in
Canada and France.237 The U.S.’s traditionally non-restrictive prescription drug
price policy regime has been partly credited with fueling the country’s pharmaceu-
tical industry’s relative competitiveness vis-à-vis its European and Japanese coun-
terparts.238 The rationale for the U.S. non-interference policy in pharmaceuticals
pricing was epitomized by former FDA Commissioner McClellan’s view that
“price controls discourage the R&D needed to develop new products.”239
However, in lieu of price control, the U.S. sought to bridge the rich and poor
prescription drug divide via the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act.240 The Act ad-
ded prescription drug coverage to the Medicare benefits, with the objective of alle-
viating the costs of medications for people with low annual incomes or high out-of-
234 See e.g. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (U.S. Conn., 2005) at 478. It
was held that confiscating private property for use as part of a redevelopment plan that
could be economically beneficial to the entire community was a permissible public use
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See generally Charles E. Cohen,
“Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Eco-
nomic Development Takings” (2006) 29 Harvard J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 491 (discusses
the Kelo decision).
235 F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, “The Economics of TRIPS Options for Access to
Medicines” in Brigitte Granville, ed., The Economics of Essential Medicines (London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002) at 49.
236 Iglehart, supra note 79 at 119–127.
237 John Carey et al., “Commentary: Drug R&D: Must Americans Always Pay?” Busi-
nessweek (13 October 2003), online: Business Week
<http://ads.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_41/b3853059.htm>.
238 Agrawal, supra note 34 at 33–35.
239 Cited in Donald Light & Joel Lexchin, “Will Lower Drug Prices Jeopardize Drug Re-
search? A Policy Fact Sheet” (2004) 4:1 The American Journal of Bioethics at W1-W4.
240 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 STAT. 2066 (2003).
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pocket medication costs.241 In the same vein, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
teamed up with public and private organizations in 2005 to create Partnership for
Prescription Assistance (PPA).242 The PPA provides a parallel prescription drug
assistance program to the Medicare Modernization Act, and has helped over three
million patients find programs that provide free or nearly free medication.243 How-
ever, while the two parallel programs have helped in easing access to prescription
drugs for low-income groups, a vast number of uninsured and ineligible patients are
still left in the cold,244 and some have resorted to Canada and Mexico for cheaper
prescription medicine.245
Canadian pharmacists estimated that at least one million Americans buy pre-
scription drugs in Canada by post or over the internet annually.246 In 2004, as the
annual internet pharmacy sales to Americans reached the $600 million mark, the
then Canadian Health Minister, Ujjal Dosanjh, informed an audience at Harvard
University that it would be an illusion to think that Canada would continue to be
the drugstore for the United States.247 However, the prescription drug purchases in
Canada are dwarfed by the $2 billion purchases made annually by Americans in
Mexico.248
The battle for importation of cheaper prescription drugs, especially from Can-
ada, has since moved into the U.S. Congress, where the House of Representatives
passed a bill in 2007 permitting the importation of cheaper prescription drugs from
241 Dawn E. Havrda et al., “Impact of the Medicare Act on Low-Income Persons” (2005)
143:8 Annals of Internal Medicine at 600–608.
242 See Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2007, supra note 95 at 19.
243 Ibid. Significantly, a 2005 study found that the Partnership for Prescription Assistance
program offered considerable savings and was superior to the Medicare drug discount
cards; See Dawn E. Havrda et al., supra note 241 at 600–608.
244 The focus of Medicare drug discount cards and of the Partnership for Prescription As-
sistance program is the low-income group. However, not everyone in the low-income
group is eligible; the pharmaceutical industry cannot realistically provide free
medicines for all indigent patients in the United States.
245 In October 2004 for instance, a 68 year old Pennsylvania woman took a 600-mile train
ride to Toronto to buy medicines. The trip saved her thousands of dollars. See Robyn
Shelton, “Trains Roll to Canada to Buy Cheaper Drugs; The Publicity Trip to Toronto
Will Offer Some Prescription Price Relief for 25 U.S. Passengers” Orlando Sentinel
(30 September 2004) online: Orlando Sentinel
<http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/nw/nw004645.php3>. President Clin-
ton once argued that no American should be forced to get on the bus to Canada in
search of cheaper prescription drugs; See Andrew Phillips, “America’s Bitter Pills”
Maclean’s (20 December 1999) at 98, online: Maclean’s.ca <http://www.macleans.ca>.
246 “Cheaper Prescription Drugs” The Economist (18 October 2003) at 32.
247 J. Cooper, “Canada to US: We’re Not Your ‘Drugstore’” Jordoncooper.com, a weblog
of faith, culture, & technology (10 November 2004) online: jordoncooper.com
<http://www.jordoncooper.com/2004/11/10/canada-to-us-were-not-your-drugstore>.
248 “Border Line Drugs” The Economist (29 January 2004) at 60.
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Canada.249 The Bush administration was widely expected to veto the bill on
grounds that the importation measure could open doors to unapproved, counterfeit
and unsafe drugs.250 In the same vein, states faced with crippling prescription drug
bills are pressuring the U.S. Federal government to mitigate spiraling drug
prices.251 This is evidenced by the State of Vermont lawsuit filed in August 2004
against the Secretary of State for Health and Human Services and the FDA, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont. The lawsuit sought a reversal of the
FDA’s refusal to allow Vermont employees to establish a prescription drug impor-
tation program from Canada.252 Similarly, in 2005, the District of Columbia en-
acted the Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act.253 The Act prohibited any pat-
ented drug from being sold in the District of Columbia for an excessive price.254
However, the Act was successfully challenged in 2005 before the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, by the Biotechnology Industry Organization and
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.255A subsequent ap-
peal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the Federal District Court on grounds, inter alia, that the Prescription Drug Exces-
sive Pricing Act was preempted by federal patent laws.256
249 Ed Silverman, “House Passes Bill Allowing Importation” Pharmalot (August 2007),
online: Pharmalot <http://www.pharmalot.com/2007/08/house-passes-bill_allowing-
importation>.
250 Ibid., the pharmaceutical industry was also opposed to the bill, and had lobbied the
U.S. Congress to defeat similar bills in the past.
251 Ram Kamath, Pharm. D & Scott McKibbin, “The Report on Feasibility of Employees
and Retirees Safely and Effectively Purchasing Prescription Drugs from Canadian
Pharmacies”, online: (27 October 2003) Office of Special Advocate for Prescription




252 Pam Belluck, “Vermont Will Sue U.S. for the Right to Import Drugs” New York Times
(11 August 2004) at 13. The FDA justified its opposition to drug importation on
grounds that it rendered the country vulnerable to terrorist attacks; See “Already
Against Drug Imports, FDA Raises Specter of Terror” USA Today (12 August 2004),
online: USA Today <http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-08-12-fda-
crawford_x.htm>.
253 Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005, supra note 144.
254 Ibid.
255 Pharm. Research, supra note 146. The District Court held, inter alia, that the Act was
pre-empted and facially unconstitutional because it did not “square with the congres-
sional purpose and objectives” of the patent laws; Ibid. at 65-66.
256 Biotechnology, supra note 148.
STRONG MEDICINE: PATENTS, MARKET, AND POLICY CHALLENGES   95
The reason that prescriptions drugs are cheaper in Canada257 and Mexico258
than they are in the U.S. is because of price control. Canada has reined in drug
prices for years, and has famously had some of the cheapest medicines in the indus-
trialized world between 1969 and 1987 by means of a compulsory licensing law for
patented pharmaceuticals.259 This strategy purportedly saved the country an esti-
mated $211 million annually.260 On the contrary, the U.S. largely leaves
pharmaceuticals pricing to market forces.261 A U.S. pioneering pharmaceutical
price mitigating regulatory regime, the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1994 that allows for
a smooth berth of generic drugs with a view to fostering competition in the pharma-
ceutical marketplace, has yet to have any salutary impacts on the efforts to rein in
soaring pharmaceutical prices after more than a decade of its existence.262
Britain was confronted with the imperatives of a restrictive drug pricing policy
option when it introduced, for the first time, a national health insurance policy in
1911.263 By 1951 when free medical care was extended to the entire population,
257 OECD Health Working Papers “Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies in
Canada” by Valerie Paris & Elizabeth Docteur, No. 24,
DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2006)4 (15 February 2007) at 1-89 (notes that the Patented
Medicine Review Board was created in 1987 to ensure that prices of patented drugs are
not excessive).
258 Moise & Docteur, supra note 74 at 1-66 (notes that regulation of pharmaceutical prices
dated back to the 1950s). Ibid. at 14-15.
259 The system allowed a manufacturer of generic drugs to produce patented drugs in Can-
ada by merely notifying the patentee and paying a fixed four per cent royalty fee. See
Christina Del Valle, “Intellectual Property Provisions of NAFTA” (1992) 4:11 Journal
of Proprietary Rights at 8; John F. Burns, “Canada Split on Drug Patents” The New
York Times (24 August 1987) at D1, online: The New York Times
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE5DE143DF937A1575
BC0A961948260>. The author notes that Canada’s compulsory licensing allowed “so-
called generic drug manufacturers . . . to copy brand-name products in Canada and sell
them for as much as 50 per cent less than the originals.”; Michael Halewood, “Regulat-
ing Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at Interna-
tional Law” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 243 at 246; Christopher Scott Harri-
son, “Protection of Pharmaceuticals as Foreign Policy: The Canada-US Trade
Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus the North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill
C-91” (2001) 26 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regula-
tion at 457; Drahos & Braithwaite, supra note 73 at 68 (comments on Canada’s inter-
ference in the investment equation of pharmaceutical companies via compulsory
licensing).
260 The estimated savings through compulsory licensing was given by a University of To-
ronto economist, Harry Eastman. See David Crane, “New Debate over Generic Drugs
Looms” The Toronto Star (9 June 1987) at A18.
261 Barton, supra note 24 at 292.
262 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. 355.
263 The Liberal government introduced the 1911 National Health Insurance Act. The aim
was to assist people below certain minimum income levels in receiving medical bene-
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the number of prescriptions under the National Health Service had ballooned to 200
million, upping government financial commitments and precipitating an undue
government pre-occupation with price regulation, to the chagrin of the pharmaceu-
tical industry of the early post World War II Britain.264 In the circumstances, the
British government either resorted to compulsory licensure to neutralize undue
market exclusivity265 or outright price curbs.266 In the 1970s, there was a notable
standoff between the British department of health and the drug firm, Hoffmann-
LaRoche.267 The latter was selling its patented tranquilizers Librium and Valium at
high monopoly prices.268 The UK Monopolies Commission recommended very
substantial price cuts on grounds that the drugs were sold at monopoly prices.269
Most recently, tensions between the British government and the pharmaceutical in-
dustry flared up again following the Office of Fair Trading 2007 Report, which
found that prescription drug prices in Britain had crept above the European aver-
age.270 The health secretary then began talks with the pharmaceutical industry,
with a view to reducing the latter’s profit margins, amidst claims that they had been
overcharging the National Health Service by hundreds of millions of pounds.271
Even with price regulation, Britain’s National Health Service is often unable
to provide expensive prescription drugs “of last resort” despite their clinical bene-
fits. For instance, in 2007, the British National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness
denied abatacept, an arthritis drug with strong clinical benefits, to 3,500 arthritis
patients on grounds that the drug was too expensive, with a high price tag of £9,000
per person per year.272 Prescription drug price regulation is the norm in Europe,
and Britain is not an exception. The practice was given a tacit legal imprimatur by
fits through national insurance for sickness funded by statutory contributions from the
employer, the government and the employed. See John Abraham, “The Political Econ-
omy of Medicines Regulation in Britain” in Helen Lawton Smith, ed., The Regulation
of Science and Technology (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2002) at 230.
264 Ibid. at 236.
265 Under the compulsory license regime preceding the 1977 Patent Act, food and drug
patents could be licensed almost as of rights, albeit on conditions to be first settled by
the Patent Office. See William Cornish, Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distract-
ing, Irrelevant? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 24–26.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid. at 27.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid.
270 John Carvel & Marianne Barriaux, “Johnson Moves to Curb Firms Overcharging NHS
for Drugs” Guardian (3 August 2007), online: Guardian <http://politics.
guardian.co.uk>.
271 Ibid.
272 Laurance, supra note 35.
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 article 4(3) Directives 2001/83/EC (as amended) regulating medicinal products for
human use as follows:
The provisions of this Directive shall not affect the powers of the Member
States’ authorities either as regards the setting of prices for medicinal prod-
ucts or their inclusion in the scope of national health insurance schemes, on
the basis of health, economic and social conditions.273
A fortiori, if developed economies in Europe and Canada find expensive pre-
scription drugs a burden so much so as to evolve regulatory strategies for its miti-
gation,274 developing economies and low-income countries would understandably
be more pressed to do so, in view of the paucity of resources.275 This was the
context in which South Africa, faced with a public health crisis precipitated by the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, intervened to curb the prices of key prescription drugs.276 In
India, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, through the provisions of the
Drugs (Prices Control) Order, was empowered to revise the prices of controlled
bulk drugs and formulations and to enforce prices and availability of medicines.277
This underscores the perceived need for a regulatory intervention, rather than the
whims of the market in pharmaceutical pricing governance.
Prescription drug cost-effectiveness pricing policy, which requires insurance
coverage of drugs that provide significant benefits relative to their costs, is gener-
ally accepted as the best way to get value for money, and is widely used in the
United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia, as costs control mechanism.278
Health benefits are usually measured in units known as quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs), while costs are generally measured from a societal perspective to com-
prise all current and future costs on the prevention and treatment of disease, and
273 Directive 2001/83/EC (as amended).
274 Devidas Menon, “Pharmaceutical Cost Control in Canada: Does It Work?” (2001) 20:3
Health Affairs at 92–103 (notes that price control had worked to a certain extent in
Canada, but prescription drug expenditures continued to rise).
275 World Health Organization, supra note 188 at 2 (notes that there is a compelling evi-
dentiary link between poverty and a high disease burden in developing countries, as
evidenced by stunted purchasing power, which in turn, diminishes the degree of inter-
est that for-profit firms take in diseases specific to poor countries).
276 South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 1965, as amended by the
Amendment Act, No. 90 of 1997.
277 The power is granted pursuant to India, Drugs (Prices Control) Order 1995, Part 2, s.
3(ii) (6 January 1995) The Gazette of India — Extraordinary. For a discussion on the
history of the Drug Control Order and the controversies on its implementation by the
National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority, see Mansi B. Shah & Amit S. Patel, “Drug
Price Control in India: An Overview” (2004) 12:2 Journal of Pharmaceutical Finance,
Economics & Policy at 123–131.
278 Donald J. Birkett, Andrew S. Mitchell & Peter McManus, “A Cost-Effective Approach
to Drug Subsidy and Pricing in Australia” (2001) 20:3 Health Affairs at 104–114; Peter
J. Neumann, “Evidence-Based and Valued-Based Formulary Guidelines” (2004) 23:1
Health Affairs at 124–134.
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any consequential savings that could arise from disease treatment and preven-
tion.279 Evidence of a drug’s cost-effectiveness is often required as a condition for
inclusion in the national formulary by national authorities.280 Limiting prescription
drug insurance coverage to cost-effective drugs is said to be a veritable instrument
for controlling drug costs,281 as it could be used to filter out ‘imitator’ or ‘me-too’
drugs that do not provide better value for money than existing drugs in national
formularies. However, it has been noted that ‘me-too’ drugs could potentially curb
prices by providing needed competition and diluting monopoly power of patented
drugs.282 In this regard, cost-effectiveness analyses’ results are mixed.
Moreover, it’s been argued that cost-effective drug therapies, while providing
medical benefits, do not necessarily save money.283 Only treatments that are cost-
saving, i.e., more clinically effective, and less costly than comparator treatment,
would actually save money.284 However, the pharmaceutical industry is said to be
strenuously opposed to cost-effectiveness analyses, which it perceived as con-
straints on drug costs.285 This is symptomatic of the pharmaceutical industry’s op-
position to any prescription drug costs mitigating initiative that is short of the
whims of the market.
However, American officials are rankled by pharmaceutical price control, es-
pecially by affluent nations.286 The general refrain amongst American officials and
the United States pharmaceutical industry, is that countries with a price cap on pat-
ented pharmaceuticals are undermining future research and innovation in ethical
pharmaceuticals287 and shifting the burden of global pharmaceuticals research and
development on the American taxpayers.288 The Bush Administration had report-
edly sought to bring the price of patented pharmaceuticals in Australia, Canada,
279 Rai, supra note 15 at 205.
280 National drug formularies comprise the list of prescription medications approved for
routine use by governments. See Neumann, supra note 278 at 125.
281 Rai, supra note 15 at 205.
282 Ibid., at 206 (notes that the characteristic significant reduction in prescription drug
prices upon the introduction of a generic drug).
283 Davidoff, supra note 222 at 1069.
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
286 Light & Lexchin, supra note 239 at W1-W4 (notes the former FDA Commissioner,
Mark McClellan’s displeasure with pharmaceuticals price control by the Europeans).
287 Ibid.; John E. Calfee, “Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Patient Welfare” (2001)
134:11 Annals of Internal Medicine at 1060–1064 (notes that pharmaceuticals price
control would undermine innovation).
288 John Carey et al., supra note 237; Davidoff, supra note 222 at 1068–1071 (notes the
general perception that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry was subsidizing drug develop-
ment in other countries, which could not afford development costs).
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Europe, and other affluent countries to the United States level, in order to counter
the growing clamor for price control in the United States.289
Notably, claims that price control in the United Kingdom and other countries
undermines pharmaceuticals research and development, and the notion that Ameri-
cans are financing the bulk of the global pharmaceutical R&D burden have been
debunked.290 According to Donald Light et al., audited financial reports of major
drug firms in the United Kingdom and Canada, showed that all research costs were
paid for with substantial profits, based solely on domestic sales at British and Cana-
dian domestic prices.291 Critics of America’s relatively high pharmaceuticals prices
argued that cutting prices in half or bringing prices down to the Canadian or Euro-
pean levels would not in any way derogate from pharmaceutical R&D budgets, if
drug companies were prepared to reduce marketing expenditures, cut back luxuri-
ous managerial allowances, or high profits.292 The perception is rife that pharma-
ceutical industry profits are excessive and that price control is justifiable to safe-
guard the public interest.293 Analysts argued that the pharmaceutical industry could
hardly justify the drug prices that fueled huge advertising and promotion expendi-
tures on the post-development costs of manufacturing pills, which was about 20 to
30 per cent of the overall sales price.294
It has been speculated that prohibitive prices could force the United States to
impose price regulation, with a view to stemming the widening medical divide be-
289 See Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, “The International War on Cheap Drugs” (2004)
18 New Doctor: Journal of the Doctors’ Reform Society of Australia at 1.
290 Light & Lexchin, supra note 239 (notes that there was no evidence to verify the claims
that price control undermines pharmaceutical R&D in Europe and Canada. He argues
further that Americans consumed more than their share of global R&D expenditures,
and that other nations were paying for the largely inefficient US pharmaceutical R&D).
291 Ibid., the findings were based on the reports submitted by 79 Canadian research drug
companies, showing that their R&D expenditures had risen by more than 50 per cent
since 1995, and that all research expenditures were paid for by domestic sales.
292 Ibid.
293 Davidoff, supra note 222 at 1068–1070 (notes that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
posted a larger profit margin than most other sectors of the economy in 1999, and that
the pharmaceutical industry was one of the most profitable industries in the world);
Ibid., at 1068; Additionally, the District of Columbia’s Prescription Drug Excessive
Pricing Act of 2005, was predicated on the findings that “[t]he excessive prices of pre-
scription drugs in the district of Columbia is threatening the health and welfare of the
residents of the District as well as the District government’s ability to ensure that all
residents receive the health care they need, and these excessive prices directly and indi-
rectly cause economic harm to the District and damage the health and safety of its
residents. . . . [I]t is incumbent on the government of the District of Columbia to take
action to restrain the excessive prices of prescription drugs”, see supra note 144 at s.
28–4551.
294 Davidoff argues that the marginal cost of making an extra batch of pills was “close to
zero”, supra note 222 at 1068.
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tween the rich and the poor.295 So far, attempts by the Congress and some states to
force a price control regime have failed mainly because the Federal government
was unwilling to allow prescription drug price control. In order to stave off or pre-
empt the United States’ government possible intervention, analysts believe that the
industry should embrace a voluntary price reduction strategy, which could benefit
the consumer, improve cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical therapies, and boost
the pharmaceutical industry’s flagging image.296 However, industry expert opin-
ions are insistent that pharmaceuticals price control policy would substantially im-
pede research and development.297 The standard industry view is that while price
control could save money in the short term, it would result in a long term loss of
lives due to consequential reduction in innovative life-saving drugs.298 Whilst safe-
guarding innovative pharmaceuticals has become the industry’s standard response
to clamors for a price cut, it is extremely doubtful that countries with price control
regimes would scrap them.
III. THE EPIDEMICS OF NEGLECTED DISEASES: THE SCALE
OF THE PROBLEM
We have never had such a sophisticated arsenal of technologies for treating
diseases, yet the gaps in health outcomes keep getting wider. This is unac-
ceptable.299
The above statement by the Director General of the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO)300 aptly captures the plight of over one billion people, about one-sixth
of the world’s population, who are susceptible to tropical diseases (TDR) that
predominate in the poorest parts of the world.301 Tropical diseases range from ma-
laria, tuberculosis, leishmaniasis, sleeping sickness, to chagas, and are otherwise
295 “High Cost of New Cancer Drugs Too High for Some?” online: (2004) 25 Pharmaceu-
tical field 179 <http://www.pharmafield.co.uk/article.aspx?issueID=25&articleID=
179>.
296 Davidoff, supra note 222 at 1070.
297 Calfee, supra note 287 at 1060–1064 (notes that price control policy could perpetuate
vested interests, become non-objective, and could well go below levels sufficient to
reward pharmaceuticals innovation); Ibid. at 1060.
298 Robert Goldberg, “Pharmaceutical Price Controls: Saving Money Today or Lives To-
morrow?” Institute for Policy Innovation Report No. 123, online: Institute for Policy
Innovation <http://www.ipi.org>.
299 Margaret Chan, Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO), cited in
David O’Connell, “Neglected Diseases” (2007) 449 Nature Outlook at 157.
300 Ibid.
301 Ibid.
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known as ‘neglected diseases’.302 They are so characterized not because of a lack
of high-quality basic research, but due to a dearth of investments for successful
translation of basic scientific research and discoveries into crucial drugs.303 The
pharmaceutical industry would not invest if there is no viable market and prospects
for recouping their investments.304
However, most of the countries where neglected diseases predominate are
poor, lack the requisite purchasing power, and are bereft of the key ingredient nec-
essary to spur pharmaceutical investments and innovation: viable commercial mar-
kets. For instance, developing countries, which comprise more than 80 per cent of
the world population, only account for about ten per cent of global pharmaceuticals
sales.305 A fortiori, due to the strategic behavior of market actors, pharmaceuticals
R&D is skewed in favour of drugs for which there is a ready and lucrative
market.306
According to the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health Re-
port,307 approximately less than five per cent of global pharmaceutical research and
development funds are devoted to diseases that predominantly affect developing
countries.308 Indeed, mectizan, Merck’s drug for river blindness, (a disease which
affects millions of people in Africa due to poor living conditions) was discovered
by pure accident. The company had been working on parasites in farm animals,
when scientists stumbled upon a compound (ivermectin) which happened to cure
river blindness.309 In order to underscore the serious health crisis neglected dis-
302 Neglected diseases are mainly tropical diseases ranging from malaria, tuberculosis,
AIDS, leishmaniasis, sleeping sickness, to chagas disease. They are otherwise known
as tropical diseases (TDR), and the World Health Organization for Research and Train-
ing in Tropical Diseases is collaborating with the World Bank and UNDP to establish
affordable and improved treatments. See the World Health Organization for Research
and Training in Tropical Diseases, supra note 22.
303 Jurgen Drews, “Drug Research: Between Ethical Demands and Economic Constraints”,
in Michael A. Santoro & Thomas M. Gorrie, eds., Ethics and the Pharmaceutical In-
dustry, supra note 17 at 21–36 (notes that, as the costs of drug R&D spiraled from the
1960s, the mutual coexistence of medical, scientific, and economic motivations for
drug R&D was substituted with strategic targeting of specific markets — those with the
most commercial promise).
304 Perelman, supra note 21 at 140–144 (notes how the market dictates pharmaceutical
research focus on diseases that would produce the most profits at the expense of dis-
eases prevalent in poor resource countries).
305 WHO, supra note 188 at 15.
306 Sebastian Buckup, “Global Public-Private Partnerships Against Neglected Diseases:
Building Governance Structures for Effective Outcomes” (2008) 3 Health Economics,
Policy and Law at 31–50.
307 World Health Organization, “Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Ec-
onomic Development”, online: WHO <http://www.who.int>.
308 Ibid.
309 Hawthorne, supra note 1 at 15.
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eases pose to poor countries, sleeping sickness, a tropical disease that is peculiarly
specific to countries with poor resources, will be examined as a case study in the
following paragraph.
(a) Human African Trypanosomiasis: A Case Study of Sleeping
Sickness
Sleeping sickness is perhaps the most vivid example of the disconnect be-
tween the world’s pharmaceutical giants and the fatal or debilitating dis-
ease of the third world’s poor.310
Human African Trypanosomiasis, commonly known as sleeping sickness, is a
classic case of one of the developing countries’ neglected diseases. The disease is
caused by the parasite trypanosoma brucei gambiense, and transmissible by the
tsetse fly.311 The disease manifests itself in two stages.312 The early stage occurs
soon after infection, and is characterized by fever, headaches, lymphadenopathy,
and organomegaly.313 The second stage could set in several months or even years
after infection, and is characterized by central nervous system breakdown and ulti-
mate fatality if left untreated.314 The disease affects 36 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa,315 has killed 66,000 in 1999, and remains a threat to 60 million people, only
seven per cent of whom have access to diagnosis and treatment.316
Pentamidine is currently the standard recommended treatment for the early
stage of the disease, but is not suitable for treatment of the disease in the second
stage.317 If the disease progresses to an advanced stage before treatment begins, it
can only be treated with melarsoprol, an archaic drug that was first introduced in
1949.318 The drug contains arsenic, is extremely painful when injected, and kills
310 See Donald McNeil Jr., “Medicine Merchants, Drug Companies and the Third World:
A Case Study in Neglect” The New York Times (21 May 2000), online: The New York
Times <http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/health/052100drug-
merchants.html>
311 Manica Balasegaram e. al., “Treatment Outcomes and Risk Factors for Relapse in Pa-
tients with Early-Stage Human Trypanosomiasis (HAT) in the Republic of Congo”,




315 The Campaign, Target Diseases, Sleeping Sickness, online: Access to Essential
Medicines <http://212.109.85.26/campaign/slp01.shtm>. The account on sleeping sick-
ness in this paper is drawn from materials on the MSF website, detailing their cam-
paign against the disease.
316 Ibid.
317 Balasegaram et al., supra note 311 at 777.
318 The Campaign, Target Diseases, Sleeping Sickness, supra note 315.
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outrightly three to ten per cent of patients treated.319 A safer drug, known as
eflornithine or DFMO, ran out of production in 1995, just five years after it first
reached the market.320 Like Merck’s river blindness drug, eflornithine was discov-
ered purely by chance. It was originally designed to treat cancer, and its production
was abandoned when it could not.321
It is significant that while research continues on sleeping sickness’s sister ail-
ment, which afflicts cattle, there has been no significant improvement in 50 years
for melarsoprol, the human version. According to Medecins Sans Frontieres, the
veterinary industry appears to hold out the only hope of a final cure for sleeping
sickness through their research to unravel the cattle version of the disease.322 The
sleeping sickness case is characteristic of the skewed results of prescription drug
economics and the implacable market logic that drives pharmaceutical innovation.
It simultaneously underscores market failure and the limitations in the quest for
proportionate research investments in drugs for all known diseases. Francois Gros,
an Aventis spokesman, summed up the workings of the pharmaceutical market
logic:
We can’t deny that we try to focus on top markets . . . cardiovascular, me-
tabolism, anti-infection, etc. But we’re an industry in a competitive environ-
ment. . . . We have a commitment to deliver performance to sharehold-
ers.323
Getting pharmaceutical companies to invest in drugs for neglected diseases is
one of the greatest public health care challenges facing the developing countries. It
would, however, take a new kind of public-private partnerships, which would not
be entirely dictated by market logic or imperatives, to deliver some of the sorely
needed medicines for neglected diseases.
(b) A New Regime of Global Public-Private Partnerships Against
Neglected Diseases
A new regime of global, collaborative public-private partnerships governance
has evolved to manage neglected diseases.324 The new regime differs radically
from the conventional public-private partnerships paradigm between publicly
funded universities or research institutions and the pharmaceutical industry.325
While the latter is defined solely by ownership rights, oiled by patents, and driven
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
321 McNeil, supra note 310.
322 Ibid.
323 Cited in McNeil, ibid.
324 The Washington Post, supra note 21 at A18 (laments the endemic incidence of ne-
glected diseases and welcomes a recent collaboration between a non-profit organization
and Sanofi-Aventis to develop a new anti-malaria drug).
325 See generally Section IIB, above, for discussion.
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by market logic and imperatives,326 the former is an ad hoc coalition of NGOs,
charities, pharmaceutical firms, and the WHO,327 and is driven by altruism.
The emergence of the non-market oriented, global public-private partnerships
for neglected diseases has been attributed to new paradigm shifts in development
discourse328 and new perceptions regarding global security threats.329 Globaliza-
tion and the concomitant liberalization of trade in goods and services are directly
implicated in the current surges in trans-border and trans-national travel,330 which
make the trans-national spread of communicable diseases such as avian influenza,
SARS, multi-drug tuberculosis, or any neglected diseases inevitable.331 It also un-
derscores the urgency of a global public health policy that transcends national bor-
ders since communicable and infectious diseases have no respect for national
frontiers.332
The WHO has consistently provided leadership and been at the forefront of
the campaigns to draw attention to, and facilitate treatment for neglected diseases
since the 1970s333 Currently, the World Health Organization for Research and
Training in Tropical Diseases is collaborating with the World Bank and United
Nations Development Program to establish modalities for affordable and improved
treatments for neglected diseases.334 In May 2000, the World Health Assembly,335
326 The conventional public-private partnerships for pharmaceuticals R&D are forged by
publicly funded universities and the pharmaceutical industry. It is an integral element
of prescription drug economics, and it is clearly defined by property rights through the
instrumentation of the patent regime. See Section IIA, above.
327 Buckup, supra note 306 at 31-32.
328 WHO, supra note 188 at 173 (notes that the preponderance of poverty and sickness in
poor countries has gained global prominence since the beginning of the twenty-first
century, because it affronts commonly-held basic human values, and the recognition of
the interdependence of the global community, and the potentially serious consequences
of the failure to tackle the problem).
329 Ibid.
330 Obijiofor Aginam, “International Law and Communicable Diseases” (2002) 80:12 Bul-
letin of the World Health Organization 946 at 947.
331 Thomas M. Gorrie, “Evolving Approaches to Healthcare Challenges” in Michael A.
Santoro & Thomas Gorrie, eds., Ethics and the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 17
at 369 (notes that increase in long-distance travel could facilitate larger outbreaks of
infectious diseases).
332 Taiwo A. Oriola, “Against the Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patents Rights as
a Biosecurity Strategy” (2007) 2 University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology &
Policy 287 at 297–309.
333 World Health Organization for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, supra note
22.
334 Ibid.
335 The World Health Assembly is the supreme decision-making body for the World
Health Organization, and meets up once a year. It comprises delegates from the current
193 Member States, and is responsible for the appointment of the Director General of
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the supreme decision-making body for the WHO, called on international organiza-
tions, non-governmental organizations, donors, foundations, and the international
community to forge a global partnership for the elimination of tuberculosis.336
There are now numerous NGOs, charitable organizations, and even pharma-
ceutical firms337 in a new global coalition against neglected diseases that are bereft
of the traditional market trappings.338 A major initiative in this regard is the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, a new international financing
mechanism championed by the United Nations.339 Leading the pack of philan-
thropic, non-governmental organization initiatives against neglected diseases is the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. To date, the Foundation has committed more
than $7.8 billion in support of global health efforts, prioritizing AIDS, malaria, tu-
berculosis, child and newborn health, and reproductive health.340 There is also the
Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control (GNNTDC), a coalition of
health organizations dedicated to controlling and eliminating neglected diseases
through a program of advocacy, resource mobilization, and access to essential
drugs and vaccines.341
the World Health Organization. See, online: WHO
<http://www.who.int/governance/en/index.html>.
336 J.W. Lee, E. Loevinsohn & J.A. Kumaresan, “Response to a Major Disease of Poverty:
the Global Partnership to Stop TB” (2002) 80:6 Bulletin of the World Health Organiza-
tion at 428.
337 It has been observed that pharmaceutical firms have made substantial contribution in
kind to public-private product-development partnerships and, that despite a lack of
market incentive, about half of the current research projects focusing on neglected dis-
eases are conducted by pharmaceutical firms. See Andrew L. Hopkins, Michael J.
Witty & Solomon Nwaka, “Mission Possible: One Billion People Worldwide Suffer
from Tropical Diseases” (2007) 449 Nature Outlook Drug Discovery at 166–169.
338 Buckup, supra note 306 at 35-36 (notes that, since the mid 1990s, a number of global
health partnerships between public and private actors have emerged to bridge the in-
vestments gap for neglected diseases created by market failures).
339 Robert Walgate, “Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria Opens Shop” (2002) 80:3
Bulletin of the World Health Organization at 259 (notes that the Fund had its first
board meeting in January 2002, and was in a position to disburse between $700 million
and $1 billion against malaria, AIDS, and TB in 2002).
340 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Media Release, “Annual Report 2006” at 14–20,
online: <http://www.gatesfoundation.org/nr/public/media/annualreports/
annualreport06/assets/GatesFoundationAnnualReport2006.pdf>.
341 GNNTDC is a new collaborative organization that is formalized by the Clinton Global
Initiative to facilitate the fight against neglected diseases, through short term and long
term strategies. It comprises the Schistosomiasis Control Initiative, Imperial College of
London, International Trachoma Initiative, Lymphatic Filariasis Support Centre, Liver-
pool School of Tropical Medicine, The Task Force for Child Survival and Develop-
ment, Helen Keller International, The Earth Institute, and Columbia University. On 8
March 2007, the body announced that it had been awarded a $8.9 million grant via
Geneva Global Inc. to fund a campaign to control and eliminate seven neglected dis-
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Given the current array of resources, institutional, governmental and non-gov-
ernmental supports, it has been opined that, over the next decade, it should be pos-
sible to produce a new generation of safe, effective and inexpensive medicines for
many of the neglected diseases afflicting the poor.342 This could be accomplished
by scaling up investments in research and development of new drugs, building a
more efficient and more open mechanism for new drug discovery, and through the
provision of crucial political leadership to align public health funding with philan-
thropic funding.343
Already, the new public-private partnerships are being put to the test, as exem-
plified by a 2007 project, using Advance Market Commitments (AMCs) for the
development of a vaccine against pneumococcal disease, with a $1.5 billion com-
mitment by a consortium of five European countries and the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation.344 Similarly, a partnership between the Drugs for Neglected Diseases
Initiative345 and the Paris-based pharmaceutical company, Sanofi-Aventis, recently
announced that it had developed, and would produce at cost, a new anti-malaria
drug.346 Sanofi-Aventis reportedly agreed not to seek a patent for the medication,
allowing generic drug manufacturers to join in and further reduce the drug’s
price.347 This underscores the central and indispensable role that pharmaceutical
firms could play in the new non-market oriented public-private partnership regime.
Arguably, these new partnerships would have to contend with the challenges
of maintaining their momentum, credibility, and achieving long term viability and
effectiveness. However, concerns have been raised about the prospects for long
term sustainability of global health partnerships as a new governance structure.348
There is, however, optimism and confidence that the new global health partnerships
would survive due to their potential to minimize the characteristically high costs of
the complex transaction required by collaborative new drug R&D.349
eases in two East African countries of Rwanda and Burundi. See, online: Global Net-
work for Neglected Tropical Disease Control <www.gnntdc.org>.
342 Benedicte Callan & Iain Gillespie, “The Path to New Medicine” (2007) 449 Nature at
164-165.
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid. Advance market commitments are assurances that the drug under development
will be purchased upon production. It’s a strategy to remedy the characteristic lack of
viable market for drugs on neglected diseases.
345 The Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi) is a non-profit initiative driven by
the public sector. It aims to research and develop new, improved, effective, affordable,
and field relevant drug for neglected diseases. See, online: dndi <www.dndi.org>.
346 The Washington Post, Supra note 21 at A18.
347 Ibid.
348 Buckup, supra note 306 at 31–50 (asks whether global health partnerships are a passing
fad or a stable pillar of governance in an emerging global public domain); Ibid. at 32.
349 Ibid., Sebastian Buckup opines that the problem of incomplete contract, and the com-
plexity of jointly produced outcomes, could up the costs of market transactions. This
provides the rationale for the existence of a global health alliance governance structure
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However, with so many actors and players, it is imperative to co-ordinate re-
sources and actions, sometimes across national borders, in order to avoid duplica-
tion and the waste of resources. For instance, the planned malaria-vaccine project,
backed by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and some European countries,350
might have to be reassessed in light of the new Sanofi-Aventis anti-malaria drug
project351 — unless, of course, a malaria vaccine would be more cost-effective, or
possess superior clinical advantages over existing drugs that are already accessible.
A collaborative open innovation network of industry and public laboratories on
ongoing drug research of neglected diseases could both eliminate duplication of
efforts and maximize the effectiveness of public private partnerships.352 Open in-
novation networks would necessarily entail sharing of research tools, data, and pat-
ents pooling.353 Collaborative research tool sharing is a classic non-market oriented
template for pharmaceutical innovation and is guaranteed to reduce the costs of
new drugs for neglected diseases. It is also the antithesis of the conventional, pat-
ents-dependent, and market oriented public/private partnerships that created the ne-
glected diseases phenomenon.
IV. THE PRICE OF PATENTS: WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS
FOR WORKABLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE PATENT
SYSTEM?
There is no denying the significance of patents to the pharmaceutical indus-
try.354 The patent monopoly ensures that the pharmaceutical industry recoups their
huge financial investments by keeping out competitors during the pendency of cru-
cial patents, which is usually 20 years.355 Primarily, the societal quid pro quo for
patent exclusivity is the expected concomitant rise in research and development
as a cost cutting strategy despite reservations in some quarters on its political legiti-
macy as a governance structure.
350 Callan & Gillespie, supra note 342 at 164.
351 Ibid.
352 Ibid. at 164-165.
353 Ibid.
354 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, “Patent Law — Balancing Profit Maximization and Public
Access to Technology” (2002) 1 The Columbia Science & Technology Law Review at
paras. 14-15, online: Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev.
<http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=4&article=1>.
355 Dutfield, supra note 14 at 98, 107; Harvey E. Bale Jr., “Patents and Developing Coun-
tries: Access, Innovation and the Political Dimensions of Trade Policy” in Brigitte
Granville, ed., The Economics of Essential Medicines, supra note 28 at 100; Richard C.
Levin et al., “Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development” in
Edwin Mansfield & Elizabeth Mansfield, eds., The Economics of Technical Change,
(Aldershot, England, Brookfield, Vermont: 1993) at 243.
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investments and the public disclosure of the invention,356 which is expected to as-
sure conditions for competitive, innovative and beneficial products.357
Whilst it is beyond the remit of this article to join the fray on the role of
patents in promoting innovation,358 it is instructive to note the counter argument —
that patents generally stifle, rather than boost innovation.359 With regard to medical
innovations for example, concerns have been raised about patenting tools of medi-
cal research, especially gene sequences.360 The proliferation of patented genes
raises the real prospects of legal barriers to the development of a range of medical
products.361 While licensing, (both voluntary and compulsory) is theoretically a
great mechanism for accessing patented tools,362 the costs could be too prohibitive,
356 Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 354 at para. 17; Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind,
“An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property” (1991) 5:1 Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 3 at 5.
357 Frederick M. Abbott, “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at WTO” (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic
Law, 469 at 472-473 (the author notes the pharmaceutical industry’s argument that
patent was indispensable to continual funding of research and development of innova-
tive pharmaceuticals).
358 There is a preponderance of polemical literature on this topic. For discussion see Edwin
Mansfield, Mark Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, “Imitation Costs and Patents: An Em-
pirical Study” (1981) 91 The Economic Journal at 907–918 (the authors ask some
firms, the bulk of which are pharmaceutical companies, “what proportion of innova-
tions would be delayed or not introduced at all if they could not be patented?” The
firms’ replies show that about one-half of the patented innovations would not have
been introduced without patent protection). It is said, for instance, that the relative pau-
city of development in the Indian pharmaceutical sector vis-à-vis the software and film
sectors, was due to a lack of pharmaceutical patent protection. See Harvey E. Bale Jr.,
“Patents and Developing Countries: Access, Innovation and the Political Dimensions
of Trade Policy” in Brigitte Granville, ed., The Economics of Essential Medicines,
supra note 28 at 103.
359 See e.g. Michael Perelman, supra note 21 at 45-73 (the author cites instances where
patents stifled innovation rather than promoted it).
360 John H. Barton, “Research-Tool Patents: Issues for Health in the Developing World”
(2002) 80:2 Bulletin of the World Health Organization at 121-125; Gerard N. Mag-
liocca, “Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation” (2007)
82 Notre Dame Law Review at 1809 (the author uses the example of blackberry patent
disputes to illustrate the perils of patent trolls for innovation. Patent troll describes the
use of patent strategically to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture
technology. It is a classic case of using patent abuse and where patent could be used to
obstruct innovation pathway).
361 Barton, supra note 360 at 121–125.
362 Ibid., this would include voluntary and compulsory licensure. National and interna-
tional patents regimes have compulsory licensure provisions. For example, Article 31
of the TRIPS Agreement incorporates the conditions under which a WTO member may
use patented technologies without the authorization of the owner; See Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 31.
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leaving researchers no choice, but to design around existing patents.363 Even if li-
censing fees were low, enormous negotiation costs and the attendant delay could
ultimately lead to an abandonment of the project.364 For example, the Indian gov-
ernment’s attempt to negotiate a compulsory license for a patented drug in the
1970s was mired in endless negotiations, and ended up in a stalemate and conse-
quential abandonment of the project.365
Another key criticism against the premise that patents are indispensable to
pharmaceutical innovation points out that the number of patents for genuinely inno-
vative pharmaceutical products is negligible; there are thousands of patents for ’up-
stream’ pharmaceutical inventions, or mere scientific discoveries, but there is a
trivial amount of patents for technical solutions.366 The end result is the prolifera-
tion of largely non-innovative ‘me-too’ drugs with no genuine therapeutic results,
which is due to the industry’s failure to produce “fundamentally new small mole-
cule drugs that work against new targets.”367 This has led analysts to suggest that
the pharmaceutical industry should tread a co-operative, rather than the well-worn
route, of patents exclusivity to innovative pharmaceuticals.368 This is not, however,
discounting patents’ relevance to pharmaceutical innovation. Rather it is a call for a
363 Barton, supra note 360 at 121–125.
364 Ibid.
365 The Indian government had, in the 1970s, requested a compulsory license. However,
the patentee only agreed to a voluntary license. The parties got stuck on royalty dis-
putes as the patentee insisted on a royalty of 25 per cent. After four years of prolonged
negotiations, the patentee agreed to accept a ten per cent royalty, which the government
still found higher than its five per cent royalty limit. The protracted process of negotia-
tion was too costly for the government, leading to the consequential abandonment of
the project. See Biswajit Dhar & K.M. Gopakumar, “Post-2005 TRIPS Scenario in
Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Sector: The Case of the Generic Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry in India” Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development (No-
vember 2006) at 22, n. 38, online: IPRsonline.org <http://www.iprsonline.org/
unctadictsd/docs/Dhar%201Indian%20Pharma%20November06.pdf>.
366 Correa, supra note 90 at 784-785.
367 Ibid. at 785; Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, “Pathways Across the
Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discov-
ery” (2008) 8:1 Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, & Ethics at 55–89 (notes that
pharmaceutical firms have largely failed to find fundamentally new small molecule
drugs, especially those that work against new targets. They note further that, on the
average, only three drugs that act on novel targets have reached the market annually in
recent years. This has led to the proliferation of ‘me-too’ drugs, new products that
represent mere incremental innovation over existing molecules).
368 Rai, Reichman & Uhlir Ibid., at 56, the authors suggest models for multi-firm and pub-
lic-private collaboration for boosting innovative drugs. This would entail “intensive
large-scale collaboration between academics, who posses unique skills in designing as-
says that can identify targets, and pharmaceutical firms that hold libraries of potentially
useful small molecules as trade secrets, making them largely off limits to these aca-
demic scientists.”
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creative use of patents to build co-operative alliances on the pathway to innovative
pharmaceuticals.369
While collaboration, rather than the current, largely closeted pharmaceutical
research and development paradigm, is crucial to innovative pharmaceuticals, it is
undeniable that the pharmaceutical industry is highly vulnerable to cheap imitations
and piracy because chemicals are easily replicable.370 Empirical study has estab-
lished that cheap imitations of original products could adversely affect incentive for
further innovation.371 This is, arguably, one of the reasons the pharmaceutical in-
dustry is ever keen on promoting stronger patent protection for pharmaceuticals372
and quick to fend off generic drugs prior to patent expiration.373
However, most developing countries lack a comparative research and develop-
ment base for innovative drug production374 and tend to focus on producing gener-
ics of patented drugs as exemplified by Mexico, India and Brazil.375 Basic research
into new molecules by India’s burgeoning pharmaceutical industry accounts for a
369 Ibid. at 57.
370 Paul R. Paradise, Trademark Counterfeiting, Product Piracy, and the Billion Dollar
Threat to the U.S. Economy (Westport, Connecticut, London: Quorum Books, 1999) at
175. Counterfeit drugs often lead to therapy failures and sometimes tragic conse-
quences. This was exemplified by the tragic deaths of an estimated 2,500 people fol-
lowing the administration of counterfeited meningitis vaccine in Niger Republic in
April 1995.
371 Tim Philips, Knockoff: The Deadly Trade in Counterfeit Goods: The True Story of the
World’s Fastest Growing Crime Wave (London and Sterlin, VA: Kogan Page, 2005) at
187–217 (the author catalogues horror stories associated with the flourishing trade in
counterfeited drugs).
372 The pharmaceutical industry was reputedly a key member of the multinational consor-
tium that pressed for stronger international patent protection in the context of the Inter-
national Trade Agreement. This culminated in the 1994 WTO-Marrakech Trade-Re-
lated Agreement in Intellectual Property (TRIPS). See M.B. Rao & Manjula Guru,
Understanding TRIPS: Managing Knowledge in Developing Countries (New Delhi,
Thousand Oaks & London: 2003) at 20–22; Robert Weissman, “A Long Strange
TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property
Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Coun-
tries” (1996) 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law
1069 at 1077 and 1083–1084. The author, inter alia, notes the strong influence of the
pharmaceutical industry on the U.S.’s drive for stronger international patent law.
373 Generics copies are fashioned after brand copies and have been empirically proven to
be cheaper than brand copies. See “Reports: Generics Offers Savings Over Imports,
Price Controls” (2004) 3:249 Drug Industry Daily.
374 Most developing countries such as Mexico, Brazil and India do better at producing
generics than innovative drugs. See Balasubramaniam, supra note 28 at 90–107.
375 Jorge Bermudez, “Expanding Access to Essential Medicines in Brazil: Recent Eco-
nomic Regulation, Policy Making and Lessons Learnt” in Brigitte Granville, ed., supra
note 28 at 178 (notes that Law 9.787/99 of October 1999 established the basic legal
framework for generic drugs manufacturing in Brazil. The law established technical
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fraction of R&D activities carried out by Western pharmaceutical companies in
2000.376 Indian pharmaceutical firms have thus resorted to producing generics of
patented drugs.377 This often leads foreign pharmaceutical firms to challenge local
firms in India for patents infringement.378 A notable recent example was the case
of Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others,379 involving patent disputes between
Novartis and Indian pharmaceutical companies at a Chennai court.380 The former
had sought patent protection for Gleevec, a modified form of its leukemia drug
under the 2005 Indian Patent Act, while the latter contended that the modified can-
cer drug constituted mere “incremental innovations”, and suffered from prior publi-
cation, lack of inventive step and insufficient description. It did not, inter alia, re-
present a new “improved efficacy” or significant improvement on the original, off
patent leukemia drug, and therefore was not eligible for protection under the Indian
Patent Act.381 Significantly, the Indian generic version of Gleevec retailed for only
about a tenth of the $2,600 that Novartis charged for a month’s course of treat-
ment382 — an indication of a direct nexus between patents and high pharmaceutical
prices.
In the context of access to essential medicines in developing countries, the
WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Doha Decla-
ration on Public Health383 provides for special measures ranging from parallel im-
port, government use, to compulsory licensure to facilitate and improve access to
affordable life-saving medicines.384 However, it has been noted that Article 31bis,
the arrowhead of the new amendment to TRIPS, which is specially crafted to facili-
standards and norms that defined the concepts of bio-availability and bio-equivalence
of generic drugs vis-à-vis branded medicines); Ibid. at 187.
376 Anna Thomas, “Street Price: A Global Approach to Pricing for Developing Countries”
in Brigitte Granville, ed., supra note 28 at 278.
377 Sampath, supra note 88 at 694–726 (notes that Indian pharmaceutical firms produced
22 per cent of global generic drugs and that the Indian Patent Act of 2005 has greatly
facilitated the production of generics); Ibid. at 699-700.
378 Khozem Merchant, “Drugs Makers Fear Patent Abuse in India” Financial Times (12
May 2002) at 4.
379 Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others, W.P. No. 24754 (2006) and W.P. No.
24759 (2006) [RNF] cited in K.D. Raju, “The Debacle of Novartis Patent Case in In-
dia: Strict Interpretation of Patentability Criteria Under Article 27 of the TRIPs Agree-
ment” Social Science Research Network (2007), online: SSRN
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030963>.
380 Amelia Gentleman, “Battle Pits Patent Rights Against Low-Cost Generic Drugs” The
New York Times (30 January 2007), online: The New York Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/business/worldbusiness/30novartis.html?_r=
1&oref=slogin>.
381 Gentleman, ibid.; See also Dhar & Gopakumar, supra note 365.
382 Gentleman, supra note 380.
383 See Para. 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, on-
line: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm>.
384 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 87 at 929–957.
112   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [7 C.J.L.T.]
tate access to essential drugs by developing countries with limited or no manufac-
turing capacity, is encumbered with administrative hurdles that could hamper its
effectiveness.385 Furthermore, the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements requir-
ing stronger intellectual property protection than TRIPS does, are generally per-
ceived as obstacles to the implementation of TRIPS’s flexibilities by developing
countries.386
This arguably informed the recent report by the Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights, Innovation and Health (CIPIH) of the World Health Organization,
urges developing countries to, inter alia, devise appropriate national legal
frameworks to facilitate access to affordable prescription drug.387 The report also
reiterates, inter alia, the virtues of the rewards or prize system as well as that of
open source approaches to pharmaceutical innovation with a view to easing the
stranglehold of patents on pharmaceuticals.388
(a) Prize or Reward Contests as Primers for Innovation
Prize or reward contests are competitions specifically designed to rally experts
into solving particular technological needs or problems for a named prize or
award.389 The idea and use of a prize or reward as incentive for innovation has
been around for a long time. For example, the British Parliament enacted the Longi-
tude Act in 1714,390 announcing up to £20,000 in rewards for the development of a
“practicable and useful” method for accurately determining longitude at sea.391
Most recently, Sir Richard Branson and Al Gore announced “The Virgin Earth
Challenge”.392 It is a $25 million Global Science and Technology Prize “for who-
ever can demonstrate to the judges’ satisfaction a commercially viable design
which results in the removal of anthropogenic, atmospheric greenhouse gases so as
to contribute materially to the stability of Earth’s climate.”393
385 Ibid., the authors, however, argue that the said administrative huddles could be over-
come by “skillful lawyering, political determination and coordinated planning.”
386 Carlos Maria Correa, “Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to
Medicines” (2006) 84:5 Bulletin of the World Health Organization at 399–404.
387 See supra note 188 at 175–188.
388 Ibid.
389 Clayton Stallbaumer, “From Longitude to Altitude: Inducement Prize Contests as In-
struments of Public Policy in Science and Technology” (2006) 1 University of Illinois
Journal of Law, Technology & Policy at 118.
390 An Act for Providing a Public Reward for Such Person or Persons as Shall Discover
the Longitude at Sea, 1714, 12 Ann., c. 15 (Eng.) cited in Clayton Stallbaumer, ibid.
391 The announcement followed the tragic sinking of a fleet of Royal Navy warships,
crewed by two thousand sailors, on the Isles of Scilly — roughly twenty miles off
southwest of England. The sailors had misjudged their position due to poor naviga-
tional equipment. One John Harrison, a clock maker, received the £20,000 top prize in
1773, some 59 years after the tragic accident. See Stallbaumer, ibid. at 117.
392 See, online: Virgin Earth Challenge <http://www.virginearth.com>.
393 Ibid.
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In the context of pharmaceutical innovation, the prize or reward contest has
been floated, not as a substitute for, but as a compliment to the patent system.394
For example, in February 2007, Canada, Italy, Norway, Russia, the United King-
dom, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, announced a $1.5 billion “Advance
Market Commitment” (AMC) for pneumococcal vaccines.395 The money is dedi-
cated to subsidizing the purchase of eligible vaccines for use in developing coun-
tries.396 The fund guarantees that any useful vaccines developed for the disease
would be purchased, and provides a critical incentive for pharmaceutical firms to
invest in R&D leading to effective vaccines for the disease. Such vaccines could
also be cheaper and affordable due to the economies of scale inherent in advance
market commitment to bulk prescription drug purchases.
Another major initiative for institutionalizing the prize system for pharmaceu-
tical innovation was the U.S. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005.397 The Act
was intended to revolutionize medical research and development in the United
States.398 According to the bill’s sponsor, Representative Bernard Sanders:
[r]ather than rely[ing] on high drug prices as the incentive for R&D, the bill
would directly reward developers of medicines, on the basis of the incre-
mental therapeutic benefit to consumers, through a new Medical Innovation
Prize Fund. Prices for prescription drugs to consumers would be at low ge-
neric prices immediately upon entry to the market. By breaking the link be-
tween drug prices and R&D, it would provide more equitable access to
medicine, end rationing and restrictive formularies, and manage overall
R&D incentives through a separate mechanism that can be increased or de-
creased, depending on society’s willingness to pay for medical R&D.399
Unfortunately the bill had no co-sponsors and never became law because no further
action was taken on it.400 The bill does, however, represent deep yearnings for an
alternative to the patent system and the potential promise of the reward system as a
394 James Love & Tim Hubbard, “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New
Medicines” (2007) 82:13 Chicago-Kent Law Review at 1520–1550; Marlynn Wei,
“Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of
2005” (2007) 13:1 Boston University Journal of Science & Technology at 25–45 (notes
that the benefits of the prize system were untested, and unlikely to dislodge the en-
trenched patent regime).
395 HM Treasury, Press Notice, “Launch of the First Advance Market Commitment for
New Vaccines” (28 February 2007) online: HM Treasury <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_18_07.htm>.
396 Ibid. Arguably, the measure is a direct response to the market’s failure to channel in-
vestments into neglected tropical diseases specific to developing countries.
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primer for pharmaceutical innovation. It has been noted that, if implemented prop-
erly, the use of prizes can potentially help the industry
make inventions freely available to competitive suppliers, leading to lower
prices and greater access, avoid waste on unimportant “me-too” products
that do not improve health outcomes, reduce incentives for excessive spend-
ing on marketing and promotion of irrational drug use, and stimulate R&D
to benefit populations with low purchasing power.401
Significantly, whilst the prize system has succeeded in other fields of innova-
tion, it remains largely untested for pharmaceutical innovation.402 Notable obsta-
cles to its implementation include institutional impediments, ascertaining who has
the authority to award prizes, the measure of award, and who pays for the prize.403
However, James Love, while noting that the aforementioned obstacles are not in-
surmountable, opines that the system of prices is ingrained in many areas of the
economy, and that “there is a reluctance to abandon a system of prices determined
by actual market transactions as the method of determining the value of knowledge
good, because there is a concern that prizes will be difficult to administer, or [will
be] inadequately resourced.”404
Additionally, some analysts believe that if patents operate in parallel to the
prize system, contestants could be tempted to apply for patents, thus truncating the
welfare benefits inherent in the prize system.405 Since it is safe to assume that we
are stuck with the patent system for the foreseeable future, subsequent patenting of
inventions entered into prize contests would be inevitable, unless, of course, it is
expressly forbidden by statutes or contractual obligations. Even if contestants were
forbidden from subsequently applying for patents, the likelihood that the contes-
tants’ invention might infringe existing patents is ever present.406 In which case,
the contestant would be forced to withdraw, invent around the patents, or enter into
a licensing agreement with the patentees.407 A fortiori, the patent system remains a
potent obstacle to the prize or reward system.
Despite the apparent obstacles, authorities should seriously explore institution-
alizing the prize or reward system to supplement the patent regime as a primer for
pharmaceutical innovation. It has been posited that where public policy goals are in
401 James Love, “The Role of Prizes in Stimulating R&D: Comment to WHO IGWG”
Knowledge Ecology International (30 September 2007), online: Knowledge Ecology
International <http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/second/contributions_section2/
Section2_JamesLove-KEI_prizes.pdf>.
402 Wei, supra note 394 at 25–45.
403 See Love, supra note 401.
404 Ibid.
405 Jerome Davis & Lee N. Davis, “Patents, Inducement Prizes, and Contestant Strategy:
Do Patents ‘Crowd Out’ Prizes?” (Paper presented to the DIME IPR workshops in
London, England, 23-24 March 2006), online: (2006) (Working Paper No. 12) at 15
<http://www.dime-eu.org/files/active/0/IPR-W_12-DavisDavis-mai03-1.pdf>.
406 Ibid. at 9–15.
407 Ibid.
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synch with prize contests objectives, the latter would flourish and compliment pub-
lic policy efforts.408 It would be hard to find a government or authority that would
not want a regime of affordable and accessible prescription drugs for its population.
What is needed is a concerted international effort, borne out of strong political will,
to forge viable prize or reward contests as a complimentary route to innovative
pharmaceuticals. The prize system has great potential to generate affordable and
accessible prescription drugs.409
(b) Could Open Source Biology Ease the Patents Pains?
Open source biology is a concept modeled on open source software. Prior to
the advent of proprietary software, which now dominates global operating systems,
open source software was the norm.410 However, the normative order of the non-
proprietary software regime began fizzling in the late 1970s and early 1980s as
spin-off companies began commercializing software.411 Proprietary software actors
soon became dominant, forcing a resurgence of the “free” software movement and
culminating in the launch of the “GNU” operating system in 1984.412
However, the increasing use of non-proprietary software in proprietary appli-
cations forced the advent of “copyleft” license, or the GNU “General Public Li-
cense” (GPL), designed to protect software users rather than software owners,
whose interests are well secured via intellectual property and licensing agree-
ments.413 The terms of GPL allow users to use, study, and modify the source code
of a licensed program, and freely exchange both modified and unmodified ver-
sions.414 The collaborative climate fostered by the GPL soon culminated in the
creation of “Linux”. Now the putative flagship of the open source movement is big
enough to rattle established proprietary software leaders.
The open source software template has been canvassed for adoption in the
context of biotechnology in order to foster collaborative research and development
of crucial life-saving drugs, which the market-oriented patent system fails to de-
408 Stallbaumer, supra note 389 at 149.
409 See Aidan Hollis, “An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation” De-
partment of Economics, University of Calgary (17 January 2005), online: Department
of Economics, University of Calgary <http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-
files/ah/drugprizes.pdf>.
410 See Hope, supra note 68 at 7 (notes that in the early days of computing, proprietary
restrictions on access to, or use of source code were rare. Most users made their own
programming and freely exchanged source code).
411 Ibid.
412 Ibid. at 8-9.
413 Ibid. at 10-11; Sapna Kumar, “Enforcing the GNU GPL” (2006) 1 University of Illi-
nois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy at 1–36.
414 Kumar, ibid. at 3.
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liver equitably and proportionately.415 While noting that the open source licensing
strategy is necessarily predicated on the existence of a proprietary right, Janet Hope
observes that a non-proprietary transfer strategy need not use the open source tem-
plate, but could instead rely on “straightforward free revealing.”416 However, some
scholars have queried the suitability of the open software template for biotechno-
logical inventions and argued that it was no more than an abuse of patents.417
Nevertheless, it has been canvassed that the opportunity costs for pharmaceuti-
cal firms seeking to adopt open source strategy for exploiting drug patents is ex-
tremely high.418 However, because not all drugs are blockbusters, the real opportu-
nity cost of an open source strategy for pharmaceutical firms could be
“substantially lower than the apparent or perceived cost.”419 Whilst acknowledging
industry’s established proprietary culture as a putative obstacle to the widespread
adoption of open source biotechnology, Janet Hope notes that it is possible for the
biotechnology industry to implement the open source business model.420
Indeed, the international HapMap Project that sequenced the human genome
was predicated on “copyleft-style click-wrap conditions” in order to facilitate ac-
cess to “haplotype mapping information.”421 Other putative evidence that shows
open source biotechnology at work includes its adoption by organizations such as
415 Katherine M. Nolan-Stevaux, “Open Source Biology: A Means to Address the Access
and Research Gaps?” (2007) 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Jour-
nal at 271-316; Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai & Andrej Sali, “Finding Cures for Tropi-
cal Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?” (2004) 6:1 Minnesota Journal of Law, Sci-
ence & Technology at 169–175.
416 This connotes straight forward publication without any licensing requirement. See
Hope, supra note 68 at 158.
417 Robin Feldman, “The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Abuse?”
(2004) 6 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science, & Technology at 117-167 (notes that the
open source template largely uses the power of the patent system in order to ensure the
availability of the core technology or innovation for free access. He notes, further, that
open source license agreement, which requires advances in technology to remain open
as the original technology, may amount to patent abuse or misuse).
418 Hope, supra note 68 at 268.
419 The author argues that in considering the opportunity cost of an open source strategy,
pharmaceutical firms should distinguish between patents on drugs and patents on re-
search tools. This is especially so because most pharmaceutical firms are reluctant to
sell research tools invented in-house. Ibid. at 268.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid. at 308.
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The BioBricks Foundation422 and the CAMBIA.423 The BioBricks Foundation
uses BioBrick standard DNA parts that encode basic biological functions, and any
individual or organization is welcome to design, improve, and contribute BioBrick
standard biological parts to the registry.424 As of 2007, over 600 students and in-
structors from over 60 universities around the world have made, shared, and used
BioBrick standard biological parts as part of the International Genetically Engi-
neered Machine competition.425 On the other hand, the CAMBIA uses BiOS (Bio-
logical Open Source) to facilitate the making and sharing of biotechnological
knowledge, with a view to eradicating “inequities in food security, nutrition, health
and natural resource.”426
Open source software demonstrates the virtues of openness and technological
freedom. Although still in a nascent state, open source biology has the potential to
extend the benefits of medical biotechnology to both the rich and the poor. Certain
government institutions and agencies are beginning to show leadership in the con-
cept of open science. For instance, the U.S. National Institutes of Health’s recent
open access policy is a significant development in institutional participation in the
open science project.427 The new NIH policy mandates public access to research
published by NIH-funded scientists within 12 months of appearing in a peer-re-
viewed publication.428 The California’s Intellectual Property and Revenue Sharing
Requirements for For-Profit Organizations, similarly mandates scientists funded by
the state of California to make a 500 word abstract available to the general public
within 60 days of publication.429 Additionally, a copy of each publication of re-
search funded by California must accompany the annual progress report.430
The fledging open science policy in the U.S. is, however, still a far cry from
the real thing: open source biotechnology. It is suggested that governments around
the world should adopt both open science and open source templates for the diffu-
sion of publicly funded biotechnological knowledge. The current proprietary plat-
form is exacting and could potentially block upstream research, drain research ex-
penditures, and up the costs of pharmaceutical research and development.
422 The BioBricks Foundation is a non-profit organization founded by engineers and scien-
tists with significant experience in both non-profit and commercial biotechnology re-
search. See, online: The BioBricks Foundation <http://bbf.openwetware.org>.
423 The CAMBIA is an independent, international non-profit institute, dedicated to creat-
ing tools to foster collaboration and life science enabled innovation. See, online: CAM-
BIA Homepage <http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html>.
424 The BioBricks Foundation, supra note 422.
425 Ibid.
426 The CAMBIA, supra note 423.
427 Bob Grant, “Open Access Lives in NIH Bill” The Scientist (18 December 2007), on-
line: The Scientist <http://www.the-scientist.com>.
428 Ibid. Such funded research shall be made available on the agency’s publicly accessible
digital archive, PubMed Central, within twelve months of publication.
429 Supra note 135 at s. 100403(a).
430 Ibid. at s. 100403(b).
118   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [7 C.J.L.T.]
Institutional and governmental leadership is crucial and could broaden the commu-
nity of open source biologists and provide a viable alternative to the proprietary
model. Whilst the dynamics and economics of biotechnology and software differ in
certain fundamental respects, open source biotechnology could, with time, enjoy
comparable success with open source software; BioBricks and CAMBIA haven
proven the viability of such potential and possibilities. It is hoped that bi-
opharmaceutical firms will join in the open source revolution, which could dramati-
cally close up the scientific information deficit in poor countries and greatly im-
prove public health.431
(c) Patent Pools: A Cooperative Approach to Innovation
Patent pools are co-operative arrangements between a consortium of at least
two companies that agree to cross-license their patents to one another or to third
parties.432 Patent pooling has a long history, and has been used strategically by
rival firms to pool resources together in order to, inter alia, achieve competitive-
ness.433 It is also a potentially potent anti-competitive tool that can be used by
firms to corner the market or crowd out other competitors through strategic licens-
ing.434 For instance, in Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, the U.S. Su-
preme Court had to dissolve a patent pool that fixed prices and blocked unlicensed
manufacturers.435 Also, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. U.S.,436 the U.S. Supreme Court
similarly dissolved patents pool of major glass manufacturers that covered 94 per
cent of all the glass manufactured in the United States.437 They had used their dom-
inant position to unreasonably inflate glass prices.438 In his judgment, Justice Hugo
Black remarked that “this country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely
successful economic tyranny over any field of industry than that accomplished by
the appellants.”439
431 Virginia Barbour, Paul Chinnock, Barbara Cohen & Gavin Yamey, “The Impact of
Open Access Upon Public Health” (2006) 84:5 Bulletin of the World Health Organiza-
tion at 339-340.
432 See Ted J. Ebersole, Marvin C. Guthrie, and Jorge A. Goldstein, “Patent Pools as a
Solution to the Licensing Problems of Diagnostic Genetics” (2005) 17:1 Intellectual
Property & Technology Law Journal at 6–13.
433 David Serafino, “Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Man-
agement Structures” Knowledge Ecology International (June 2007), online: Knowledge
Ecology International
<http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=69>.
434 For a discussion of patent pooling as a potential anti-competition tool, see Steven C.
Carlson, “Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma” (1999) 16 Yale Journal on Regula-
tion at 359–373.
435 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (U.S., 1912)
436 Hartford-Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 386 (U.S., 1945).
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
439 Ibid. at 436-37.
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Nevertheless, patent pooling has potential benefits in the field of biotechnol-
ogy, which primarily exploits “the biological templates of DNA and RNA.”440 The
proliferation of patents on genetic information could potentially create obstacles for
upstream research if patentees are unwilling to license, or if license fees are prohib-
itive.441 This is especially so for medical research tools, which the pharmaceutical
industry often treats as trade secrets and is reputedly reluctant to license them.442
Even in cases where companies were willing to license their biotechnological pat-
ents, the transactional costs of technological transfer could potentially drain re-
search expenditures.443 There is, thus, a strong incentive for firms to enter “into a
co-operative dynamic that facilitates more cost-effective common access to vital
technology, while preserving competitive business practices sufficient to thwart
anti-trust implications.”444 Such collaborations could solve the problems often
posed by patented genetic diagnostics, which could potentially block upstream re-
search or product development, up research and development costs, and make med-
ical innovation more expensive. A fortiori, patent pooling is potentially a great
cost-cutting collaborative tool for pharmaceutical firms and other alliances and
partnerships. Its wide adoption by the biopharmaceutical industry could lead to an
overall reduction in research and development costs and prescription drug prices.
(d) Supplementing the Monocultural Prescription Drug Economics
with Non-Market Oriented Public-Private Partnerships Regime
In section III.B. of this article, the burgeoning new regime of non-market, not-
for-profit, public-private partnerships against neglected diseases is analyzed.445 It
should be possible to replicate the regime’s governance structure, finance, and
objectives for dealing with all manner of diseases generally. A non-market oriented
public-private partnership would not have to necessarily sell prescription drug at
costs, but it should not operate a profit-maximizing policy as is currently the case
for most pharmaceutical firms.
A non-market public-private partnership paradigm is feasible if pharmaceuti-
cal firms would moderate advertising and promotional expenditures and recognize
government subsidies and tax rebates in prescription drug pricing. As discussed in
section III.B. of this article, the WHO has done an excellent job championing the
battle against neglected tropical diseases. It has provided the crucial leadership
440 Lawrence M. Sung & Don J. Pelto “The Biotechnology Patent Landscape in the United
States as we enter the New Millennium” (1998) 1:6 The Journal of World Intellectual
Property 889 at 895.
441 Ebersole, Guthrie & Goldstein, supra note 432 at 6–13; Barton, supra note 360 at
121–125.
442 Hope, supra note 68 at 268.
443 Barton, supra note 360 at 121-125; Sung & Pelto, supra note 440 at 889–901.
444 Sung and Pelto, supra note 440 at 893; Ebersole, Guthrie & Goldstein, supra note 432
at 11.
445 See Section IVB, above.
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needed for galvanizing the international coalition of governmental and non-govern-
mental organizations, and charities against neglected diseases. However, it is cru-
cial that similar international non-market oriented public-private partnerships are
replicated to tackle the spiraling prescription drug costs, not only in poor countries,
but across the world. Making prescription drugs affordable for all and sundry, irre-
spective of nationality or place of residence is arguably within the constitutional
remit of the World Health Organization.446
(e) The Case for a Global Convention on Neglected Diseases and
Affordable Prescription Drugs
The twenty first century ushers in the awareness that national and international
health is inseparable.447 The threats posed by communicable diseases, such as the
avian flu and SARS, and the real prospects of bioterrorism, reinforce the perception
that geographical boundaries are no bulwark against global pandemic diseases.448
Significantly, international law has been historically crucial to global communica-
ble disease surveillance,449 and is arguably the most suited tool for managing ne-
glected diseases and affordable prescription drugs globally.
However, the transnational law on global health governance is largely dispa-
rate and ad hoc. These range from the World Health Organization’s International
Health Regulations 2005,450 international human rights law,451 the WTO TRIPS
446 See generally the Constitution of the World Health Organization, (Geneva: World
Health Organization, 1948). The preamble to the constitution provides, inter alia, that
“[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, eco-
nomic or social condition.” A lack of access to affordable prescription drug clearly
derogates from this provision.
447 Allyn L. Taylor & Douglas W. Bettcher, “International Law and Public Health” (2002)
80:12 Bulletin of the World Health Organization at 923.
448 Oriola, supra note 332 at 297–309.
449 Aginam, supra note 330 at 946 (notes that communicable diseases governance did not
come within the normative confines of international law until the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, specifically in 1851, when France conveyed the first international sanitary
conference).
450 World Health Organization International Health Regulations (1969) as amended in
2005 and in force since June 2007, online: <http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/WHA58-
en.pdf>. This is a legally binding agreement on international public health security, and
provides a legally biding framework for coordinating the management of global public
health emergency.
451 Roberto Andorno, “Biomedicine and International Human Rights Law: In Search of a
Global Consensus” (2002) 80:12 Bulletin of the World Health Organization at 959 —
963 (notes how international human rights principles have been integrated into bi-
omedicine and cites, in particular, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights, and the Helsinki Declaration); David P. Fidler & Law-
rence O. Gostin, “The New International Health Regulations: An Historic Development
for International Law and Public Health” (2006) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics at
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Agreement on Public Health,452 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human Gen-
ome and Human Rights,453 Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine,454 to the Constitution of the World Health Organization.455 Signifi-
cantly, none of these conventions directly addresses the twin problems of neglected
diseases and affordable prescription drug procurement as such. Although WHO is
loosely and generally mandated by its constitution to oversee global health govern-
ance,456 there is neither a specific mandate to effect crucial changes in the market
oriented global pharmaceutical research paradigm,457 nor a mandate to ensure af-
fordable prescription drug globally. In fact, WHO has often been criticized for ex-
ceeding its remit and meddling in matters reserved for the World Trade Organiza-
tion, whenever it ventured into the challenges posed by intellectual property to
global public health.458
Moreover, although WHO is an important partner in the burgeoning public
private partnerships regime against neglected diseases, it is a governance structure
that lacks normative order — its membership is voluntary, its aims are altruistic,
and its legitimacy is open to legal challenge.459 Moreover, it has been observed that
the current high level interests of the international community and NGOs in health
85–94 (notes the incorporation of human rights principles into the new International
Health Regulations).
452 WHO, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, (01-5860)
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001), online: WHO
<http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/print.html>.
453 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights, (1997), on-
line: UNESCO <http://www.unesco.org/ethics>.
454 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
Doc. 36ILM817 (1997), online: Council of Europe
<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/bt/cassese/cases/part3/ch16/1121.pdf>.
455 Constitution of the World Health Organization, (Geneva: World Health Organization,
1948), online: WHO <http://www.who.int>.
456 Frank P. Grad, “The Preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization”
(2002) 80:12 Bulletin of the World Health Organization at 981–984 (comments on the
significance and strength of the preamble to the WHO Constitution).
457 Jurgen Drews, “Drug Research: Between Ethical Demands and Economic Constraints”
in Michael A. Santoro & Thomas M. Gorrie, eds., Ethics and the Pharmaceutical In-
dustry, supra note 17 at 21 — 36.
458 ICTSD, “WHO Committee on Drug Innovation and Prices Underway in Geneva” (7
November 2007) 11:38 BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, online: ICTSD
<http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/7636> (notes that the WHO Director-General
was aware of critics’ objections that the WHO was usurping WTO territory by med-
dling in intellectual property matters).
459 It is clearly conceivable that the new regime of public-private partnership is vulnerable
to legal challenges bordering on the legitimacy of its authority.
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problems afflicting poor countries would wane or fizzle overtime, as “the interna-
tional community exhausts its limited attention span and resources”.460
Arguably, this informed the signing of a petition in 2005 by a coalition of non-
governmental organizations, academics and politicians, urging WHO members to
adopt a Kyoto-style global medical treaty.461 The underlying principle of the pro-
posal was to extract governmental commitments to spending a certain proportion of
their national income on medical research and development.462 This would obviate
a complete reliance on private equity for financing of pharmaceutical innova-
tion.463 While governments are morally obliged to cater to the health of their citi-
zens, and are already obliged under numerous international treaties on social and
economic rights (albeit unenforceable), having a global medical treaty would pro-
vide the necessary legal imprimatur and incentive for governmental responsibility
and transparency, especially in non-democratic regimes.
The proposed global medical treaty should institute a legal framework that
would vest in the WHO, an express power to manage neglected diseases and af-
fordable prescription drugs globally. Undoubtedly, WHO has the expertise, the
credibility, the global reach, and the experience to carry out the tasks. The proposed
treaty should expressly indicate what the powers of WHO are with regards to intel-
lectual property rights and public health issues. It should also stipulate financial
obligations of member states to supporting global public health governance. The
treaty should also have room for NGOs to participate in global public health issues,
and accord them the legal backing and protection necessary. Under the auspices of
the proposed treaty, WHO should have the mandate to work with national govern-
ments, pharmaceutical firms, and investors to encourage prize contests, open source
biology, and patents pooling to boost pharmaceutical innovation.
CONCLUSION
This article notes the significance of access to affordable prescription drugs,
and the eradication of neglected diseases to achieve a wholesome global public
health status. It observes that the twin issue of spiralling prescription drug prices
and neglected diseases pose serious policy challenges for governments around the
world. It reviews the literature and empirical studies on the dynamics of the mar-
ket-oriented prescription drug economics, and canvasses for non-market public-pri-
460 Lawrence O. Gostin, “A Proposal for a Framework Convention on Global Health”
(2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 989 at 992-3 (canvasses for the es-
tablishment of a Framework Convention on Global Health, that would have legally
binding commitments from member states to meeting the basic survival of the world’s
least healthy people).
461 Andrew Jack, “WHO members urged to sign Kyoto-style medical treaty” Financial
Times (25 February 2005), online: Financial Times <http://www.ft.com>.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
STRONG MEDICINE: PATENTS, MARKET, AND POLICY CHALLENGES   123
vate international partnerships to rein in spiraling prescription drug prices and man-
age neglected diseases.
While noting that regimes that overly implement price control, in an effort to
rein in run-away prices, could be counter-productive, the article notes the inevita-
bility of price controls, as already implemented in Canada, European countries,
Mexico, and India. The article canvasses for the acceleration of clinical trials and a
regulatory approval process for new drugs in order to achieve early market debut,
ensure competitiveness of comparative products and ensure competitive pricing.
However, the suggestion is made subject to the caveat that abridged clinical pro-
grams, and to an early approval process that would not prejudice the right of human
research subjects or jeopardize drug safety and efficacy.
There is a strong nexus between patents and high pharmaceutical prices. This
article notes the problems with the market-oriented prescription drug economics
and canvasses for non-market oriented public-private partnerships to supplement
the current system. The article supports the call for a global medical treaty and
notes that it is best suited to set the agenda and provide a crucial legal framework
for managing neglected diseases and affordable prescription drugs. 
